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RETHINKING REVIEW STANDARDS IN ASYLUM

ANDREW TAE-HYUN KIM*
ABSTRACT
Factual findings drive asylum adjudication. If immigration judges
get them wrong, they risk sending refugees back to persecution.
Recent studies have exposed an immigration agency that is prone to
inaccurate and ill-considered fact-finding due to its structural
problems. Without the political will or the financial capital necessary
to fix what many acknowledge as a compromised system of adjudication, the agency may continue to render decisions that cast doubt on
its capability and expertise. With an agency either unable or
unwilling to ensure an accurate and fair fact-finding process, the
first meaningful review of an asylum applicant’s claim happens at
the federal courts of appeals, where judges continue to affirm the
agency’s decisions under a most deferential understanding of the
substantial evidence standard of review. This Article exposes that
anomaly and articulates an understanding of the substantial
evidence standard that allows reviewing judges more latitude to
consider the capabilities and credibility of the agency when they
assess agency findings of fact. It argues that, in light of the agency’s
severe under-resourcing problems, judges should review the agency’s
factual findings less deferentially and exercise their discretion to
remand decisions back to the agency if they lack confidence in the
accuracy and fairness of the fact-finding process. The price to pay for
not doing so is the risk of sending an individual to persecution.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University, College of Law. J.D. Harvard Law
School; B.A. Duke University. For helpful conversations and insightful comments, I thank
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workshops at Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center in September 2011 and
at Syracuse University, College of Law in January 2013. I also thank Megan Bice (LSU, Paul
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“[E]ach time we wrongly deny a meritorious asylum application,
concluding that an immigrant’s story is fabricated when, in fact, it
is real, we risk condemning an individual to persecution.... [W]e must
always remember the toll that is paid if and when we err.” Judge
Calabresi1
INTRODUCTION
Judicial review over agency action has received both extensive
judicial analysis and scholarly attention.2 The scope of that review
over agency factual determinations remains, however, comparatively neglected. In asylum3 adjudication, an agency’s factual
determinations can wholly drive the outcome of the case. Asylum
decisions are not only fact intensive, but the question of whether a
noncitizen meets the statutory definition of a refugee—in reality, a
mixed question of law and fact—is treated in the asylum context
only as a question of fact.4 This distinction is critical because the
scope of appellate review over factual determinations occurs under
the more deferential substantial evidence standard,5 whereas courts
1. Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2006).
2. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363 (1986); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on
Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE
J. ON REG. 1 (1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006) [hereinafter Judges];
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761 (2008) [hereinafter Arbitrariness Review]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies
of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2011); Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Peter H.
Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984; Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of
Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (2002); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96
VA. L. REV. 135 (2010).
3. The United States offers asylum to foreign nationals who can show that they meet the
definition of a refugee—someone who has “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006).
4. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[F]indings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling
& Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and
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can review mixed questions of law and fact less deferentially.6 The
scope of review over immigration agency factual determinations has
become even more deferential with the passage of the REAL ID Act,7
which further curbed the already limited scope of judicial review of
an immigration judge’s credibility determination. Credibility
determinations, in connection with the related factual findings, play
a decisive role in many asylum cases.8
This trend towards more circumscribed appellate review has
occurred despite recent studies that have cast doubt on the agency’s
competence and expertise, including the shortage of resources and
time for immigration judges to adequately consider each case,9
significant grant rate disparities among immigration courts,10
political biases of some immigration judges and Board of Immigration members,11 and the lack of meaningful review of immigration
judges at the agency level.12 This has prompted scathing critiques
from many federal circuit court judges, including one declaration
from Judge Richard Posner that the immigration adjudication at the
agency level has fallen below the minimum standard of justice.13
In this Article, I argue for an interpretation of the substantial
evidence standard of review that gives reviewing appellate judges
the latitude to more strictly scrutinize an agency’s factual determimust do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.”).
6. See NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir. 1961) (concluding that
an agency’s conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact arguably get less deference than
an agency’s conclusions on pure questions of fact).
7. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C.).
8. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is
a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 129 (2006) (describing credibility assessments as
the “most crucial aspect of any asylum case”); Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the
Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 367, 368 (2003) (depicting credibility as “the single biggest substantive hurdle” for an
asylum applicant); Scott Rempell, Credibility Assessments and the REAL ID Act’s
Amendments to Immigration Law, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 185, 187 (2008).
9. Sydenham B. Alexander, III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts,
21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 19-21 (2006).
10. See generally JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009).
11. Alexander, supra note 9, at 30-36.
12. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635,
1657-65 (2010).
13. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
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nations and to remand for further factual development if the
procedures employed at the agency level do not give that judge
confidence in the accuracy of the fact-finding process. In Part I, I
analyze an important debate in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit over the meaning of the substantial evidence
standard in asylum cases. I show that the Second Circuit sometimes
applies a stricter standard in asylum cases that gives less deference
to an agency fact-finder than to a district court judge under the clear
error standard of review, which is seemingly contrary to a general
understanding of substantial evidence review. In Part II, I articulate why this stricter standard makes sense as a matter of policy
given the immigration agency’s structural incapacities, including its
serious under-resourcing problem, threats to decisional independence, and barriers to agency-level review of immigration judge
decisions. In Part III, I claim that the traditional reasons for
deferring to agency fact-finding—comparative advantage, agency
expertise, political accountability, and finality—do not apply with
as much force in this context.14 In Part IV, I provide the legal basis
for stricter review of immigration agency fact-finding under the
substantial evidence standard.
I. SCOPE OF ASYLUM REVIEW UNDER THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
STANDARD: THE CURRENT DEBATE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
A. Asylum Procedure
One method for claiming asylum is to file an application with the
immigration court after the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has initiated removal proceedings.15 If the DHS has not
instituted removal proceedings, however, the noncitizen can file an
affirmative application with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
14. In this Article, I focus on review of fact-finding in asylum cases, in part, because the
argument for stricter review there is the most compelling, as an erroneous decision can mean
sending the person back to persecution. But the rationales for less deferential review may also
apply to fact-finding in immigration cases generally. See Michael Kagan, Dubious Deference:
Reassessing Appellate Standards of Review in Immigration Appeals, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 101,
106-07 (2012) (arguing for less deference in immigration fact-finding generally and advocating
for a balancing test akin to procedural due process instead of categories of deference).
15. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b)(3) (2012).
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Service (USCIS),16 where asylum officers with specialized training
to adjudicate claims conduct interviews and either grant the
application or refer the matter to an immigration judge for removal
proceedings.17 In the latter case, the applicant can renew the
application de novo before the immigration judge.18 Asylum officers
refer approximately 65 percent of affirmative applications to the
immigration courts;19 thus, immigration courts adjudicate most
claims for asylum. Both the noncitizen and the government can
appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), the agency’s appellate body.20 After exhausting all
administrative remedies,21 an asylum applicant can file a petition
for review of the agency’s removal order to the United States Court
of Appeals.22
B. Source of the Substantial Evidence Standard
When presented with an asylum appeal, the court of appeals
examines agency fact-finding under the substantial evidence
standard of review. That review standard appears in a number of
enabling acts and as one of the standards enumerated in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).23 Both section 706 of the APA
and the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe24 specify that the standard applies only to formal agency
action.25 The standard even predates the APA, going as far back as
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the substantial evidence
standard in the pre-World War II case Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB.26
16. Id. § 208.4(b)(1).
17. Id. § 208.14(b), (c).
18. Id. § 208.4(a). The immigration judge may rely on the asylum officer’s findings of fact,
id. § 1240.7(a), but the immigration judge ultimately exercises de novo review of the asylum
application, id. § 1003.42(d).
19. RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 33.
20. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2006).
22. Id. § 1252(b)(2).
23. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
24. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
25. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557.
26. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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There, the Court defined substantial evidence as “more than a
mere scintilla.... [and] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”27 A few decades
later, the Court decided Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, where it
clarified the meaning of the substantial evidence standard in the
APA and the Taft-Hartley Act.28 Going against the findings of the
NLRB, the Second Circuit directed the Board to reinstate with back
pay an employee found to have been discharged for giving testimony
under the Wagner Act and ordered the Board not to discriminate
against an employee who files charges or gives testimony under the
Act.29 In striking down the Second Circuit’s decision, the Court
harmonized the meaning of the standard in the APA and the TaftHartley Act with the earlier usage of the term in Consolidated
Edison.30 The Court in Universal Camera Corp. instructed reviewing
courts to consider the record as a whole before concluding that some
evidence, or more than a “scintilla,” supported the agency’s
decision.31 Despite this requirement to review and consider the
whole record, the substantial evidence standard remains deferential
and has been characterized as being even more deferential than the
standard circuit courts use in reviewing district courts’ findings of
fact.32
C. The Varied Application of the Substantial Evidence Standard
in Asylum Cases
Though removal proceedings constitute formal agency action, the
procedures specified in the APA do not apply to them under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).33 Congress has determined
that the procedures designated under the INA shall be the “sole and

27. Id. at 229.
28. 340 U.S. 474, 476, 496-97 (1951).
29. Id. at 476.
30. See id. at 477.
31. Id.
32. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999); Verkuil, supra note 2, at 687-88
(listing the following standards of review in “telescopic order” from “narrow to wide scope or
breadth” of review: (1) arbitrary and capricious, (2) substantial evidence, (3) clearly erroneous,
and (4) de novo).
33. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).
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exclusive” procedures34 governing removal proceedings.35 The
Supreme Court imported the substantial evidence standard into the
immigration context in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,36 and the standard
governs appellate review of factual determinations made by
immigration judges and Board members.
But the application of that standard has not been even. In
addition to the Second Circuit’s “stricter” formulation, courts have
characterized the substantial evidence standard in asylum cases as
follows: “[F]indings of fact are conclusive unless the record demonstrates that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary;”37 the “standard ‘requires a certain
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2006); see also Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955)
(“[W]e cannot ignore ... the direction in the statute that the methods therein prescribed shall
be the sole and exclusive procedure for deportation proceedings. Unless we are to require the
Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the
Administrative Procedure Act, we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes
the hearing provisions of that Act.”). But see McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 1986)
(applying § 556(e) of the APA to asylum proceedings).
35. Additional evidence suggests that the procedures defined in the INA have become
unhinged from the APA. Previously, the INA provision governing the standard review of
asylum claims specified that asylum claims shall be reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard, which tracked the language of the APA. Congress has amended the statute to
remove reference to the substantial evidence standard and to replace it with the “compelling
reversal” language from Elias-Zacarias. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).
36. 502 U.S. at 481 (holding that BIA determinations of asylum and withholding of
removal are conclusive “if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record as a whole”). In that same case, however, Justice Scalia stated in dicta that “[t]o
reverse the BIA finding [of fact] we must find that the evidence not only supports that
conclusion, but compels it.” Id. at 481 n.1. The plain language of this statement could restrict
the substantial evidence standard. Congress codified Justice Scalia’s language. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”). However, it is unclear whether
the application of the standard has actually changed. Some circuits have been using Justice
Scalia’s language, while others have not. See Stephen M. Knight, Shielded from Review: The
Questionable Birth and Development of the Asylum Standard of Review Under Elias-Zacarias,
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 133, 147-50 (2005). Still some cite both Justice Scalia’s “compel” standard
while also referencing the “more than mere scintilla” language of Universal Camera Corp. See,
e.g., Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Under the substantial evidence standard, the BIA’s finding
must be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”
(internal citations and quotations omitted)).
37. Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 685 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hang
Kannha Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004)).

590

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:581

minimum level of analysis from the immigration judge (IJ) and
BIA,’ as well as ‘some indication that the IJ considered material
evidence supporting a petitioner’s claim;’”38 “we must affirm the
[IJ’s] decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole;”39 “the
substantial evidence standard is demanding;”40 “[t]he substantial
evidence standard ... is more deferential than the ‘clearly erroneous’
standard used in reviewing findings of fact by a district judge;”41 and
“[w]hile this is a highly deferential standard, the [c]ourt will vacate
and remand for new findings if the agency’s reasoning or its factfinding process was sufficiently flawed.”42
D. Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft: Stricter Review in Immigration?
The meaning of the substantial evidence standard has been
expressly debated in recent years in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.43 In Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, the panel opinion
authored by Judge Calabresi provocatively stated that “[s]ubstantial
evidence review in the immigration context is ‘slightly stricter’ than
the clear-error standard that the circuit courts typically apply in
reviewing a district court’s factual findings.”44 Under this formulation of the review standard, the court overturned the immigration
agency’s factual determinations.45 The case involved a Chinese man
named Qiu who sought asylum and withholding of removal on the
ground that he and his family faced persecution by Chinese
authorities who forced his wife to undergo sterilization under
China’s population control policies.46 The immigration judge
38. Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 705 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Poradisova v. Gonzales,
420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005)).
39. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2006).
40. Wang v. Gonzales, No. 05-3594, 2006 WL 225279, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2006).
41. Ji Ying Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2007).
42. Jin Yi Liao v. Holder, 558 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2009).
43. Susan Green, Substantial Evidence Versus Clear Error Review: Which Is More
Deferential, and Why? The Debate in the Second Circuit, IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL., Dec. 2008, at
3, 3 (concluding that substantial evidence review requires a more deferential review than
clear error review).
44. 329 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Shi Wang Lin v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007).
45. Id. at 156.
46. Id. at 143-44.
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concluded that Qiu’s story was incredible, unacceptably vague, and
lacked corroboration.47 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.48 While
it disagreed with the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the BIA
nonetheless held that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s
conclusion.49 It affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that the applicant’s
testimony lacked the requisite specificity and that his corroborating
evidence was not enough to remedy his “general” and “vague”
testimony.50
The Second Circuit disagreed. In overturning the BIA and IJ’s
decisions, the court concluded that the BIA erroneously relied on
factual determinations that were not supported by substantial
evidence.51 It identified two fact-finding errors upon which the BIA
based its decision. The first was the IJ’s conclusion that the fine
receipt Qiu presented was not credible because its denomination
was in dollars, not in yuan.52 According to the court, the agency
ignored Qiu’s testimony that he was fined 1000 yuan and that a
“patently obvious explanation” for the dollar notation on the receipt
was due to translator oversight.53 The second fact-finding error was
the IJ’s conclusion that the Chinese government did not believe that
Qiu had two children at the time that he and his wife fled.54 From
this, the IJ inferred that the threat of forced abortion and sterilization was not genuine.55 The IJ determined that Qiu’s family registry
did not include one of his sons, despite Qiu’s testimony that he had
listed his son on his brother’s registry.56 Therefore, Qiu did not have
reason to fear the Chinese government, for the government would
have been aware of only one other child prior to the pregnancy and
birth of the third child.57 The IJ reasoned that the government was
only aware of two children, both of whom had been registered with the
47. Id. at 145-46.
48. Id. at 146.
49. Id. at 147.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 154-55.
52. Id. at 155.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 146 (stating that according to the U.S. State Department, the Chinese government allows up to two children before it imposes penalties in rural areas).
56. Id. at 155.
57. Id.
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Chinese government, and that Qiu faced no problem from the
government.58 The court held that the agency’s conclusion that Qiu’s
son was not registered was speculative and unsupported by
substantial evidence.59 It concluded that speculating from Qiu’s
statement that he listed his eldest child on his brother’s registry to
conclude that government officials did not know of Qiu’s two
children “dangles from a chain of flimsy speculations.”60
Though the court’s application of the substantial evidence
standard to these facts may not be particularly controversial,61 its
characterization of the substantial evidence standard is. The panel’s
formulation of the standard provides an appellate court a larger lens
through which it can do a more searching inquiry of an agency’s
factual finding, which seems incongruous with the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Dickinson v. Zurko that the substantial evidence
standard is more deferential to the fact-finder than the clear error
standard applied to district-court-level factual finding by judges or
juries.62
Despite Zurko, as well as the generally accepted view of administrative law scholars that reviewing judges should be more deferential to an administrative trier of fact than to a trial judge,63 several
Second Circuit decisions after Qiu have not only repeated the dicta
that the substantial evidence standard is “‘slightly’ stricter than the
clear-error standard that the circuit courts typically apply in
reviewing a district court’s factual findings,” but have followed Qiu
in reversing the IJ’s factual determinations.64
E. Cases Citing Qiu: A Review
Since Qiu, eight Second Circuit cases have repeated Judge
Calabresi’s strict formulation of the substantial evidence standard.65
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. But see Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (clarifying that
speculations and conjectures are permissible as long as there is at least one probative fact to
support the conclusion reached).
62. 527 U.S. 150, 153, 165 (1999); see also Verkuil, supra note 2, at 687-88.
63. See Verkuil, supra note 2, at 688.
64. See Qiu, 329 F.3d at 149.
65. The slightly stricter language is not limited to cases in the Second Circuit. The
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In six of the eight cases,66 the court reversed the IJ’s factual
findings. This reversal rate of 75% is remarkably high.67 According
to other scholars’ empirical studies of review standards, the
expected reversal rates for cases reviewed under the substantial
evidence standard is anywhere from 15%68 to 33%.69 Though these
rates are from broader studies not limited to immigration cases, one
available study found similar results when analyzing immigration
cases at the courts of appeal in 2006. Of the nearly 5,400 immigration appeals decided that year, the courts reversed and remanded
17.5% of the time.70 The reversal rates varied among circuits, with
a low of 5% in the Fourth Circuit to a high of 25% in the Seventh
Circuit.71 The Second Circuit reversed about 22% of immigration
cases.72 The study does not distinguish among the different types of
immigration cases. For the subset of cases decided under the
substantial evidence standard, one would hypothesize that the
reversal rates would be even lower than the 17.5% because the
sample contains the non-deferential de novo review of questions of
language originated in the Ninth Circuit in the 1980s, see Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488
(9th Cir. 1986), and has been cited in its opinions into the 1990s, no less than ten times. See
Lall v. INS, No. 96-70363, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17193, at *2 (9th Cir. July 7, 1997); PadillaRocha v. INS, 97 F.3d 1460, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Aruta v. INS,
80 F.3d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1996); Delfin v. INS, 83 F.3d 426, at *3 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision); Castillo-Ponce v. INS, 69 F.3d 543, at *2 (9th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision); Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1995);
Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 925 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 937
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988). But
unlike the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition in all but two cases. After
stating a less deferential review standard, one would expect a more favorable outcome for the
petitioners. That has not been the case in the Ninth Circuit, however, where the standard
originated, suggesting that Ninth Circuit judges are not applying a stricter—i.e. less
deferential—standard. The Sixth Circuit has also applied the slightly stricter language. See
Wang v. Gonzales, No. 05-3594, 2006 WL 2252579, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2006). Like the
majority of Ninth Circuit cases, the Sixth Circuit, applying the standard, denied the petition.
66. The two cases the court did not reverse are Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172,
181 (2d Cir. 2006) and Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391, 397 (2d Cir. 2005).
67. Though the sample size may be too small to permit broad inferences, the high reversal
rate is nonetheless significant.
68. Verkuil, supra note 2, at 689.
69. Zaring, supra note 2, at 137.
70. John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions Year 2006, IMMIG. L. ADVISOR, Jan.
2007, at 5, available at http://eoirweb/library/lib-index.htm.
71. Id.
72. See id.
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law. This makes the 75% reversal rate of the agency for the eight
cases citing the stricter formulation of the standard all the more
remarkable. While it is unclear whether the application of the more
deferential understanding of the substantial evidence standard
would have made a difference in the outcome of these cases, such a
high reversal rate at least suggests that the application of the
stricter standard may matter.73
The six cases that reversed the immigration judges’ factual
findings under the stricter standard are varied in terms of subject
matter of claims, country of origin, panel composition, and the like.
Two out of the six cases involve claims of persecution on account of
political opinion.
In Secaida-Rosales v. INS, the Second Circuit revived the slightly
stricter language for the first time since Qiu.74 The petitioner there
sought asylum and withholding of removal based on alleged
persecution from government officials and extra-governmental
forces that threatened him and his family on account of their
membership in an organization that sought to protect citizens’
property from improper government seizure.75 The Second Circuit
concluded that the IJ relied on a number of erroneous legal
standards as well as inappropriate speculation and conjecture in
assessing the evidence, which formed the basis for her adverse
credibility finding. The court held that the adverse credibility

73. A more thorough empirical analysis of these decisions, accounting for panel
composition; political affiliations of judges; and other factors that may have caused such high
reversal rates, would have to be performed to assess whether the standard of review is
outcome determinative. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 2, at 689. But this remarkable result
implies that standards of review may be outcome determinative. But see Zaring, supra note
2, at 169-70, 190-97 (showing empirically that different standards of review may not matter
and advocating for one reasonability standard).
74. 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003).
75. Id. at 302-05. The IJ dismissed his petition largely because she found Secaida-Rosales
to be incredible. Id. at 305. She noted the omission of two facts on his asylum application that
he later included at the hearing; the implausibility of his safe, continued employment while
subject to persecution; his failure to produce additional corroborating evidence; and the lack
of coherent responses during cross-examination. Id. at 308.
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finding was neither based on valid, cogent reasons,76 nor supported
by substantial evidence.77
In Lin Zhong v. U.S. Department of Justice, petitioner Lin sought
review of the IJ and BIA’s denial of his application for asylum and
withholding of removal on the basis that he and his family suffered
under China’s one-child policy.78 He claimed that when his wife
became pregnant with their third child, Chinese family planning
officials forced her to abort the child and ordered him to undergo
sterilization.79 The IJ found him incredible due to significant
discrepancies between the two testimonies he gave and found his
documentary evidence non-corroborative.80 The IJ also found that
Lin’s pending divorce from his wife removed any threat of sterilization.81 The Second Circuit concluded that two key rulings by the IJ,
which were central to Lin’s claims, lacked substantial evidence.82
The court found that the IJ’s conclusion that his pending divorce
removed the threat of sterilization was unsupported by substantial
76. Id. at 313. The court’s requirement that an adverse credibility finding be based on
inconsistencies that go to the heart of the claim has been superseded by the REAL ID Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 309 (2005), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). See Xiu Xia
Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (recognizing that the REAL ID
Act allows an IJ to base an adverse credibility finding on “any inaccuracies or falsehoods ...
without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the
applicant’s claim”) (emphasis omitted). Nevertheless, the court’s analysis as to the substantial
evidence standard remains good law.
77. 331 F.3d at 313. For example, the court reasoned that the purported implausibilities
concerning Secaida-Rosales’s continued employment and receipt of a government
identification card were not supported by substantial evidence because the country conditions
report stated that rogue groups like the death squads whom Secaida-Rosales says threatened
him operate independently of and hidden from the government.
78. 480 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
79. Id. at 109-10. Lin fled his home and discovered that family planning officials destroyed
his home after unsuccessfully searching for him there. When his wife became pregnant for the
fourth time, family planning officials subjected her to another forcible abortion and pursued
and threatened Lin for sterilization.
80. Id. at 113.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 130-31. The first ruling concerned the IJ’s determination that Lin’s wife’s
abortions in 1990 and 1991 were not forced but voluntary because Lin’s wife was issued
abortion certificates for them. The IJ presumably based this conclusion on a State
Department country report. However, the court found no mention of such fact in the 1999 U.S.
State Department report, the only one included in the administrative record. It further
reasoned that even if such evidence were in the report, it would be unreasonable to draw
inferences regarding circumstances of abortions performed in 1990 and 1991 from a report
prepared a decade later.
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evidence because the IJ had heard of the pending divorce only
minutes before rendering the oral decision and had not inquired into
the matter.83
Three cases involved claims of persecution based on religion. In
Poradisova v. Gonzales, a husband, wife, and their son sought
asylum from religious persecution in Belarus on account of their
Jewish ethnicity and religion.84 The IJ found numerous facts leading
to her conclusion that the Poradisovs failed to meet their burden of
proof of persecution.85 The court concluded that the IJ erred not only
by applying the wrong legal standards, but also by ignoring relevant
evidence.86 Characterizing the IJ opinion and BIA’s summary
affirmance as a mere “search for a justification to deport,” the court
granted the petition.87
In Ivanishvili v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Second Circuit
considered a petition for review from a woman from the Republic of
Georgia, who sought asylum and withholding of removal for alleged
persecution on account of her status as a member of an ethnic and
religious minority group.88 The IJ rejected Ivanishvili’s asylum
claim as untimely because she failed to apply within one year of her
last arrival in the United States.89 Regarding her withholding of
removal claim, the IJ did not believe Ivanishvili’s testimony that
she had been persecuted because of her ethnic status and as a
Jehovah’s Witness in the Republic of Georgia and deemed unpersuasive her evidentiary support.90 The court affirmed the IJ’s conclusion
on the asylum claim but reversed for lack of substantial evidence
83. Id. at 131.
84. 420 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2005).
85. Id. at 78-79.
86. Id. at 79. For example, the IJ’s conclusion that the Poradisovs’ claims were
uncorroborated was belied by State Department reports that confirmed the Poradisovs’
account of the general societal and political anti-Semitism in Belarus. Further, the IJ’s
conclusion—that the incidents the Poradisovs recounted did not amount to
persecution—failed to consider the cumulative significance of each incident. Moreover, the IJ
significantly weighed the fact that the Poradisovs did not file police reports after each
incident. The court discounted this finding because record evidence established that the police
themselves are anti-Semitic in Belarus. Id. at 80.
87. Id. at 82. The court instructed the agency on remand to conduct a “good-faith inquiry
into whether an applicant is entitled to this country’s protection.” Id.
88. 433 F.3d 332, 335-36 (2d Cir. 2006).
89. Id. at 339.
90. Id. at 340.
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the IJ’s factual finding that the harassment Ivanishvili suffered did
not amount to persecution.91 According to the court, the IJ relied on
a country conditions report and “other background evidence” to
reach this conclusion but ignored the petitioner’s own testimony,
even though the IJ did not explicitly discredit such testimony as
incredible.92
In Jin Teng Lin v. Gonzales, the court overturned several of the
IJ’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.93 Lin
claimed to be Episcopalian but was unable to explain the difference
between that denomination and others, which formed a basis for the
IJ’s adverse credibility finding.94 The court concluded that Lin’s
inability to compare his stated religious group to other denominations does not necessarily indicate lack of knowledge of his group.95
Finally, one case concerned a claim of persecution based on social
group. In Hong Ying Gao v. Gonzales, the court reviewed a claim by
a nineteen-year-old woman whose parents sold her into marriage.96
She claimed that when she broke off the engagement, her former
fiancé beat her and threatened that his uncle, a powerful local
official, would arrest her.97 Out of fear that she would be forced to
marry him, Gao fled China for the United States.98 The IJ concluded
that Gao was not persecuted on account of a particular social group
because her situation involved a mere dispute between two families,
that Gao failed to meet her burden of establishing that the Chinese
government would not protect her, and that she could have relocated within China to avoid persecution.99 The Second Circuit
overturned these conclusions under the substantial evidence
standard because the IJ failed to consider plausible alternative
explanations.100
91. Id. at 340-41.
92. Id. at 341.
93. No. 05-4699-ag, 2006 WL 2195795, at *2-3 (2d Cir. July 28, 2006).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, Keisler v. Hong Ying Gao, 552
U.S. 801 (2007).
97. Id. at 64.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 70-71.
100. Id. at 65-66, 70-71. First, the court held that Gao belonged to a particular social group
of “women who have been sold into marriage (whether or not that marriage has yet taken
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In addition to the variation in subject matter, the post-Qiu cases
also varied as to the basis for reversal, applicant’s country of origin,
and panel composition.101 The common thread among the cases is
the stricter formulation of the standard of review.102
place) and who live in a part of China where forced marriages are considered valid and
enforceable.” Id. at 70. Second, the court overturned the IJ’s two factual findings under the
substantial evidence standard. Id. at 63-66, 71. Concerning the IJ’s first conclusion that Gao
failed to meet her burden of establishing that the Chinese government would not protect her,
the court stated that such finding of fact lacked substantial basis because the State
Department report stated that trafficking in women for marriage or prostitution is
widespread in China and that official efforts to combat this problem have been hampered by
corruption and resistance by village leaders. Id. at 71. Moreover, Gao’s testimony that her
fiancé threated to have his uncle, a powerful government official, arrest her corroborated such
evidence. Id. Concerning the IJ’s second conclusion that Gao could find safe haven within
China, the court pointed to Gao’s relocation attempt to a place an hour away from her home,
which was met with further harassment of her and her family and ultimately proved
unsuccessful. Id.
101. In three of the six cases, the court overturned the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 132 (2d Cir. 2007);
Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342-43 (2d Cir. 2006); Secaida-Rosales v.
INS, 331 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 2003). Most of the claims involved applicants from China. See
Lin Zhong, 480 F.3d at 108; Hong Ying Gao, 440 F.3d at 64; Jin Teng Lin v. Gonzales, No. 054699ag, 2006 WL 2195795, at *4 (2d Cir. July 28, 2006). The countries of origin of the
applicants in the other cases were Guatemala, Belarus, and the Republic of Georgia.
Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2005); Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 335; SecaidaRosales, 331 F.3d at 301. The panel composition in each of these six cases was equally varied.
Four different judges authored the majority opinions, two of whom were Democratic
appointees and two of whom were Republican appointees. Lin Zhong, 480 F.3d at 107;
Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 335; Hong Ying Gao, 440 F.3d at 64; Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 73;
Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 301. Judges Calabresi and Straub were Democratic appointees,
whereas Judges Cardamone and Oakes were Republican appointees. See Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-present, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/judges.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). One case, Jin Teng Lin v. Gonzales, was disposed
of by summary order and thus did not identify the opinion’s author. 2006 WL 2195795, at *1.
The panel there consisted of Judges Newman, Straub, and Katzmann. Id.
102. See Lin Zhong, 480 F.3d at 109; Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 337; Hong Ying Gao, 440 F.3d
at 64; Jin Teng Lin, 2006 WL 2195795, at *4; Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77. The two cases that
affirmed the agency’s decision under the “stricter” formulation of the substantial evidence
standard are not particularly distinguishable from the six cases that reversed under the
standard. In Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, the court denied the petition of a Costa Rican man
claiming persecution based on his sexual orientation. 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2006). There, the
IJ concluded that Joaquin-Porras’s sexual assault was an isolated incident and that his brief
detention and verbal abuse did not amount to persecution. Id. at 177. The court agreed and
affirmed the IJ’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. Id. at 181-82. In
Islami v. Gonzales, Judge Calabresi affirmed the IJ’s denial of Islami’s claim of persecution
based on his refusal to join the Albanian national army, though he disagreed with the IJ’s
factual findings. 412 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir. 2005). The IJ found that Islami’s refusal to
participate in the military, which was known to perpetrate crimes against humanity against
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F. Siewe v. Gonzales: Challenging the Stricter Formulation
In Siewe v. Gonzales, Chief Judge Jacobs challenged the Qiu
formulation of the substantial evidence standard.103 Siewe involved
a native and citizen of the Republic of Cameroon seeking review of
the BIA’s summary affirmance of the IJ’s denial of his claims for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture.104 Siewe claimed that he was persecuted on
account of his political opinion due to his affiliation with the Social
Democratic Front, Cameroon’s largest opposition party.105 The IJ
found Siewe’s testimony and evidence incredible because they
contained internal inconsistencies.106 She doubted the authenticity
of a number of documents Siewe submitted as evidence, such as a
photocopied arrest warrant, a medical report, and a letter purporting to appoint Siewe as a campaign manager, and she rejected his
explanations for omitting various incidents from his asylum
application and asylum interview, such as his participation in a
violent incident that gave rise to his arrest.107 These doubts led to an
adverse credibility finding, which inevitably led to a denial of his
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture.108
The Second Circuit agreed and rejected Siewe’s challenge that
the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was based on impermissible
speculation.109 The court concluded that the record evidence
supported the IJ’s inference that Siewe’s arrest warrant was not
authentic.110 The IJ doubted the authenticity of the arrest warrant
because Siewe testified that the one he acquired was only a copy
because the original had been creased, and the IJ noted the copy
Muslims and ethnic Albanians, did not amount to past persecution. Id. at 396-97. Judge
Calabresi found that this conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 397.
But because the government met its burden to show changed country conditions, Judge
Calabresi affirmed the IJ and denied the petition. Id. at 398.
103. 480 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2007).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 165-66.
107. Id. at 165.
108. Id. at 162, 170-71.
109. Id. at 162, 171.
110. Id. at 162, 169.
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showed no evidence of having been creased.111 The court concluded
that the absence of a streak mark on the copy supported the IJ’s
inference that the original must have been undamaged.112 The IJ
also found it significant that Siewe could not explain why the arrest
warrant stated that he had five children, when he testified he had
two.113 The court concluded that this error supported the IJ’s
conclusion regarding the inauthenticity of the document.114 The
court also accepted the IJ’s disbelief that an arrest warrant would
have the term “political police” on it.115 Although Siewe explained
that the warrant’s use of the term was a result of careless language
and that Cameroonian authorities were not overly concerned with
how the term would look to foreigners, the court noted that the IJ’s
conclusion was plausible and that the court cannot reverse a finding
of fact even if another conclusion is more reasonable.116 The court
also found plausible the IJ’s disbelief of Siewe’s testimony that he
left Cameroon by traveling in his own name and carrying his own
arrest warrant.117 The court briefly addressed a number of other
findings concerning his corroborating evidence that led to the
adverse credibility finding118 but noted that, because corroborating
evidence is often limited in the immigration context, a single false
document or a single instance of false testimony can “infect the
balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence”
and found permissible the IJ’s application of the maxim “false in one
thing, false in everything.”119
Courts routinely affirm agencies’ adverse credibility findings
under the substantial evidence standard;120 what is remarkable
about Siewe, therefore, is not the result but the way it was reached.
In authoring the opinion, Chief Judge Jacobs carefully explicated
the parameters of the substantial evidence standard.121 He began by
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166, 170.
Id. at 170.
See, e.g., Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2004).
Siewe, 480 F.3d at 166-67.
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stating that, when reviewing credibility decisions in an immigration
context, the scope of review is “exceedingly narrow”122 because “the
IJ has the unique advantage among all officials involved in the
process of having heard directly from the applicant.”123 Concerning
Siewe’s argument that the IJ’s findings were speculative, he
distinguished between fair inference and bald speculation, only the
latter of which would warrant reversal under the substantial
evidence standard.124 Because the “very essence of [the fact-finder’s]
function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable,”125 “[d]ecisions as to
... which of competing inferences to draw are entirely within the
province of the trier of fact.”126 According to the court, speculation is
permissible, indeed required, because that is what fact-finders do
when they choose what seems to them to be the most reasonable
inference when facts are in dispute.127 Speculation is impermissible
only when there is a “complete absence of probative facts to support
the conclusion reached.”128
To support this view, the decision relied on cases involving
speculation challenges to fact-finding at the district court level.129
Just as a reviewing court would not overturn a fact-finder’s choice
under the clear error standard when there are two permissible
views of the evidence, a reviewing court should not overturn a factfinder’s conclusions under a similar circumstance in the administrative context.130 In direct response to the Judge Calabresi-authored
Qiu decision, the panel opinion in Siewe asserted that the substantial evidence standard in the administrative context “bespeaks no
lesser deference to an IJ than to a district judge when each draws
inferences from the evidence as a finder of fact.”131 It then went on
to show why it finds no support in the law for a stricter formulation

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 166 (quoting Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Id. (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73).
Id. at 167-69.
Id. at 167 (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)).
Id. (quoting Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Como, 232 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946)).
Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 168.
Id.
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of the substantial evidence standard.132 The Ninth Circuit case from
which Judge Calabresi borrowed the slightly stricter language,
Aruta v. INS, drew its formulation from a series of four other
cases,133 and the fourth one, which began the chain, actually yielded
no support for the view that substantial evidence review is stricter
than clear error review because the context of the case was inapposite.134 That case, Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,135 was decided after
the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which made withholding of
removal no longer discretionary.136 Therefore, to clarify the correct
standard for reviewing withholding of removal claims, the court in
Bolanos-Hernandez stated that abuse of discretion review had been
replaced by “a heightened, substantial evidence standard of
review.”137 As such, the Siewe panel explained that a conclusion that
the substantial evidence standard is stricter than the highly
deferential abuse of discretion standard does not necessarily yield
Judge Calabresi’s conclusion that the substantial evidence standard
is stricter than clear error review.138
The Siewe analysis actually finds analogous support in a
Supreme Court decision, although it is not cited. In Dickinson v.
Zurko, the Supreme Court decided a case that turned on the
difference in standards of review.139 There, the Court reviewed an en
banc decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that
reviewed a Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decision to deny the
respondents’ patent application.140 The Federal Circuit reviewed the
PTO’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard of
review,141 which governs a district court’s factual findings,142 rather
than using the framework set forth in the APA,143 which specifies
132. Id. at 168 n.1.
133. See id.; 80 F.3d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1996).
134. See Siewe, 488 F.3d at 168 n.1 (discussing the chain of cases from which the stricter
language arose).
135. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
136. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
137. See Siewe, 480 F.3d at 168 n.1 (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1282 n.8).
138. Id. at 168.
139. 527 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1999).
140. Id. at 150.
141. Id. at 153.
142. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)).
143. Id.
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the proper scope of judicial review as either the “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion” standard or the “substantial
evidence” standard.144 The Federal Circuit concluded that an
exception to section 706 of the APA applied under section 559,145
which states that the APA does “not limit or repeal additional
requirements ... recognized by law.”146 According to the Federal
Circuit, prior to the adoption of the APA, its predecessor court, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, applied the clearly erroneous
standard to review factual findings by the agency,147 which was a
stricter standard than the “arbitrary or capricious” or the “substantial evidence” standard articulated in the APA.148
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit and
refused to recognize the exception.149 In so concluding, the Court
clarified that an important purpose of the APA was to “bring
uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity.”150 The Court
recognized the inconsistency in the century-long precedent in the
Supreme Court and the various appellate courts throughout the
nation. The phrase “clearly erroneous” has been used to review
agency decisions under a more deferential standard in a number of
cases,151 and at least on one occasion, the Court has used the words
“substantial evidence” to review a trial court’s factual findings.152
Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the Commissioner of Patents
on several grounds. The Court presumed that the PTO, as the
“expert body,” is better able to “deal with the technically complex
subject matter” in its conclusions of fact than an appellate court.153
Moreover, the PTO’s findings are entitled to more deference than
findings by a trial judge precisely because of the agency’s
144. Id. at 152 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
145. Id. at 154.
146. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 154, 158.
149. Id. at 165.
150. Id. at 155. Justice Breyer also cited the Court’s decision in Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951), a case that helped clarify the substantial evidence
standard and that “recogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial
review of administrative action.” Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154.
151. Id. at 156.
152. Id. at 156-57.
153. Id. at 160-61.
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expertise.154 In so concluding, the Court clarified that the substantial evidence standard is more deferential to the trier of fact in the
administrative context, making review under the clear error standard less deferential than review under the substantial evidence
standard.155 A significant assumption underlying this rule is that,
unlike a trial court—whose comparative advantage lies only in
direct evaluation of a witness, for example—an administrative
agency has expertise in that particular area of the law.156 The Court
noted that the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court frequently
referred to technical complexity and agency expertise as reasons
that counsel significant deference in the PTO context.157
Though not explicitly stated, the importance of the finality of an
agency decision is another assumption underlying the Court’s
adoption of a standard stricter than clear error. A law review article
cited by Justice Breyer in Zurko provides a historical basis for the
substantial evidence standard.158 It explains that when Congress
considered the Logan-Walter bill—the APA’s predecessor bill that
passed both houses of Congress but which President Roosevelt
vetoed159—it debated the propriety of adopting the clear error
standard over the substantial evidence standard when reviewing
administrative findings of facts.160 The legislative debate revealed
that some members of Congress favored the substantial evidence
standard over the clear error standard because it would give
administrative findings more finality.161 According to the article’s
author, Robert Stern, a greater degree of finality should be given to
findings by an administrative agency than to findings by the trial
court.162 Indeed, Stern goes as far as to equate the level of deference
under the substantial evidence rule to that under jury verdicts,
claiming that the deference owed under it is “identical” to the

154. Id.
155. See id. at 159-61.
156. See id. at 160-61.
157. Id. at 160.
158. Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Juries: A
Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 84-88 (1944).
159. S. Rep. No. 752, at 189-90 (1945) (Comm. Report).
160. Stern, supra note 158, at 88.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 88-89.
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substantial evidence standard in administrative law.163 Stern notes
that the Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”164 This indicates that, though one may draw
a different conclusion from the evidence, the finding or verdict
should stand. A reviewing court cannot set aside the finding or
verdict because it would have reached a different conclusion.165
According to Stern, though the level of deference accorded to a
jury and to an administrator may be “identical,” the reasons for
according that deference are different.166 The purpose of deferring
to a jury is to leave decision making to “persons embodying the
underlying sense of fairness of the community, rather than a single
man, no matter how expert, who might have arbitrary notions of his
own.”167 Deference is accorded to administrative findings for exactly
the opposite reason—to secure the advantage of expertise and
specialization, not broad community senses of fairness.168 Indeed, in
his invocation of Lavender v. Kurn, a case involving a speculation
challenge to a jury’s finding, Chief Judge Jacobs in Siewe implicitly
equates findings of fact by administrative judges to findings of fact
by juries.169 According to him, because the Supreme Court announced the principle of deference in Lavender categorically, it is
not limited to a jury context and should also apply to a review of
administrative findings of fact.170
G. Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Department of Justice: A Response to
Siewe
Since the rebuke in Siewe, neither Judge Calabresi nor any other
Second Circuit judge has made statements about the comparative
strictness of the substantial evidence standard to the clear error
163. Id. at 74.
164. Id. at 73 (quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300
(1939)).
165. Id. at 89.
166. Id. at 81-82.
167. Id. at 81.
168. Id. at 81-82.
169. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Lavender v. Kurn, 327
U.S. 645, 653 (1946)).
170. Id.
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standard. However, a Second Circuit panel, which included Judge
Calabresi, offered a rejoinder in Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Department of
Justice, a forced abortion case.171 Mei Chai Ye, a native and citizen
of China, claimed that Chinese authorities subjected her to two
forced abortions and that she feared they would subject her to
involuntary sterilization if she returned to China.172 During the
hearing, the IJ suspected that Ye’s asylum application resembled
another application filed by a different asylum applicant.173 Further,
the same attorney represented both applicants.174 Because of the
“striking similarity” between Ye’s affidavit and that submitted by
another petitioner in an unrelated case and Ye’s inability to provide
any convincing response as to the similarity, the IJ found that Ye
had submitted a fabricated application for asylum.175 In concluding
that an inter-proceeding similarity can support an adverse credibility finding, the panel decision relied on the court’s case law holding
that an intra-proceeding similarity can indicate that the statements
are “canned.”176 Thus, the panel concluded, an IJ’s drawing an
inference of falsity from an inter-proceeding similarity was reasonable and provided substantial evidence for the IJ’s conclusion.177
What is conspicuously absent in Mei Chai Ye is a stricter
formulation of the substantial evidence standard. In a footnote, the
panel opinion acknowledges that the Second Circuit has been
inconsistent in its recitation of the substantial evidence standard.178
That footnote characterizes the position in Qiu—that in the
immigration context, substantial evidence review is slightly stricter
than clear-error review—as dicta.179 But it also describes as dicta
the Siewe position that the two standards may be identical.180
171. 489 F.3d 517, 520 (2d Cir. 2007).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 520-21.
175. Id. at 522-23.
176. Id. at 524 (citing Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 523-24 n.4.
179. Id. at 523 n.4.
180. Id. Judge Jacobs’s actual articulation of the substantial evidence standard as
compared to the clear error standard in Siewe was as follows: “These standards of review
bespeak no lesser deference to an IJ than to a district judge when each draws inferences from
the evidence as a finder of fact.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Though the debate remains unresolved, the footnote attempts to
minimize the utility of standards of review:
[W]hile the various statements made in the course of upholding
or rejecting the adequacy of a particular finding are often
helpful, they cannot become rigid rules of law that dictate the
outcome in every case.... In practice, panels will have to do what
judges always do in similar circumstances: apply their best
judgment, guided by the statutory standard governing review
and the holdings of our precedents, to the administrative
decision and the record assembled to support it. And sound
judgment of this sort cannot be channeled into rigid formulae.181

H. The Importance of the Debate
Mere “disagreement over formal labels,”182 in the words of Judge
Calabresi, can in fact have significant legal consequences. Congress
has carefully calibrated the appropriate standards of judicial review
over fact-finding by administrative agencies, the purpose of which
is to allocate the decision-making responsibilities between the
executive and judicial branches of government.183 In so doing,
Congress has made a choice to weigh the desire for efficient and
timely agency action against the need for consistent and just
decision making.184 In more practical terms, identifying and arguing
under the correct standard of review matters for attorneys, as
judges should and generally do pay particular attention to stay
within the bounds of each review standard. Judges faithfully recite
the appropriate review standard and explain the scope of that
review in each opinion they author. Scholars have given much
attention to standards of review as well. Entire treatises have been
written to explain the meaning of various standards of review,
parsing how much deference must be accorded under each.185 In the
181. Mei Chai Ye, 489 F.3d at 523 n.4 (quoting Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141 (2d
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
182. Id.
183. Verkuil, supra note 2, at 681.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS: STANDARDS OF
REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS
(2007).
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administrative law scholarship over the past decade, scholars have
spilled much ink explicating the difference between arbitrary and
capricious review, the substantial evidence standard, clear error
review, and de novo review;186 standards of review do matter.187
The issue is not merely academic. For persons seeking asylum,
it could mean the difference between risk of persecution and
safety.188 Though Judge Calabresi does not support his reasoning for
his stricter review standard with a legal argument, his position is
defensible as a matter of both policy and law. The stricter review
standard makes sense, especially in light of the recent studies that
have cast doubt on the immigration agency’s institutional competence and expertise, including the shortage of resources and time for
immigration judges to adequately consider each case, significant
grant rate disparities among immigration courts, political biases of
some BIA members, and the lack of meaningful review of immigration judge decisions at the agency level.189 Part II outlines the
reasons that not only suggest, but indeed compel stricter review of
immigration agency decisions.
II. REASONS FOR STRICTER REVIEW: DEFICIENCIES WITHIN
IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION
In 2005, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit declared
“that the adjudication of [asylum] cases at the administrative level
has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”190 As a
prelude to this remarkable statement, Judge Posner stated that
over the prior year, the Seventh Circuit had reversed immigration
cases in whole or in part 40 percent of the time,191 a “staggering”192

186. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 2, at 688.
187. But see Zaring, supra note 2, at 135.
188. See Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[E]ach time we wrongly
deny a meritorious asylum application, concluding that an immigrant’s story is fabricated
when, in fact, it is real, we risk condemning an individual to persecution.... [W]e must always
remember the toll that is paid if and when we err.”).
189. See generally RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 10.
190. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
191. Id. at 829.
192. Id.
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percentage given the highly deferential standard of review usually
accorded to the agency’s findings.193
Judge Posner is not alone in his criticism of immigration judges
and the BIA. Decisions in at least six circuits have voiced similar
disapproval of the agency’s performance. While reversing the agency
in Ssali v. Gonzales, Judge Ripple, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
commented that “[t]his very significant mistake suggests that the
Board was not aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s]
case.”194 Another Seventh Circuit panel, in Dawoud v. Gonzales,
stated that “[t]he IJ’s opinion is riddled with inappropriate and
extraneous comments, such as reference to the IJ’s personal
experiences with alcohol in Egypt, commentary on the state of the
tourism industry there, and speculation about the attractiveness of
the United States to asylum-seekers in general.”195 The Third
Circuit, in Qun Wang v. Attorney General, commented that “[t]he
tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the [immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court television show
than a federal court proceeding.”196 In Jin Chen v. U.S. Department
of Justice, the Second Circuit stated that the IJ’s findings were
“grounded solely on speculation and conjecture.”197 The Ninth
Circuit, in Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, observed that “the [immigration judge’s] assessment of Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by
prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture.”198 The
Fourth Circuit, in Camara v. Ashcroft, criticized the IJ for “completely ignor[ing]”199 independent evidence and for “fail[ing] to follow
the [agency]’s own regulations.”200 Numerous other circuit judges
have voiced similar comments.201 What is also striking about this

193. Guendelsberger, supra note 70, at 3.
194. 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005).
195. 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005).
196. 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005).
197. 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
198. 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005).
199. 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004).
200. Id. at 372.
201. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (citing at least seven other cases
containing similar critiques of IJs and the BIA); see also Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 51314 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing two more recent cases in the Fourth Circuit and other academic
commentary critical of the performance of the IJ and the BIA).
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list is that the criticisms are coming from judges appointed by both
Republican and Democratic presidents.202
These significant errors arise from serious structural problems
at the agency. Judge Posner’s critique has appropriately spawned
various studies and proposals for reform.203 I analyze some of those
findings below.
A. Lack of Institutional Capacity: Under-Resourcing Problems at
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)204
Removal hearings are adversarial proceedings. Both the noncitizen and the government provide testimony, can call available
witnesses, introduce documentary evidence—which is subject to
objections—and make closing statements. How these hearings differ
from other proceedings is the massive caseload relative to the
number of judges capable of handling it. During the 2012 fiscal year,
immigration judges received a total of 296,173 immigration
matters205 and completed a total of 206,225 cases.206 That same year
began with 266 total immigration judges,207 but hiring freezes and
retirement eligibility decreased that number to 258 immigration
judges by the end of fiscal year 2012’s third quarter.208 Assuming
that the cases are divided evenly among the 266 judges, and that
each case takes the same amount of time to complete, each immigration judge would have had to complete approximately 1,001 cases a
202. Judges Posner, Ripple, and Neimeyer, who authored these opinions, are Reagan
appointees, whereas Judges Wood, Graber, Fuentes, and Pooler, who also authored opinions,
are Clinton appointees. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 101.
203. See, e.g., RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 1-6, 61-76; Legomsky, supra note
12, at 1644-51.
204. The EOIR is a part of the Department of Justice and was created by the Attorney
General in 1983. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.0, 1003.9, 1003.10 (2012); 48 Fed. Reg. 8038-39 (Feb.
25, 1983).
205. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACIMMIGRATION (Aug. 2013), http://trac.syr.edu./
phptools/immigration/court_backlog/.
206. Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRACIMMIGRATION (Aug. 2013),
http://trac.syr.edu./phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_poctime_outcome.php.
207. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION,
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AND APPEALS (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013
justification/pdf/fy13-ara-justification.pdf.
208. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION,
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AND APPEALS (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2014
justification/pdf/ara-justification.pdf.
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year.209 According to one study, such numbers mean that an average
immigration judge was required to complete 4.3 removal cases each
day,210 which leaves an average immigration judge with only about
seventy-three minutes to consider each case.211 In those minutes, the
judge must review the evidence, hear testimony, and render a
decision over matters that are often highly fact intensive and that
may require consideration of numerous documents. Though an
immigration judge can issue a written decision that is served on the
parties at a later date, most often the decision is rendered orally due
to time constraints.212
To make matters worse, immigration judges lack the necessary
support staff.213 As of August 20, 2009, 232 immigration judges
shared only 56 law clerks. This equals to about one law clerk for
four judges. They also lack necessary administrative support.214
Such shortages are more acutely felt in the immigration context
because of challenges that are particular and unique to an immigration hearing. For example, a third of asylum seekers are
unrepresented.215 This means that immigration judges must take
additional time to advise the noncitizen of basic legal concepts and
procedures, work usually done by the representing attorney.
Moreover, in addition to functioning as a neutral, impartial arbiter
in the case,216 an immigration judge has a duty to establish and
209. This figure is a rough estimate and does not take into account a range of other factors,
such as the number of cases that are on backlog.
210. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1652. Legomsky notes that others have estimated the
average case load at four per day, COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 43-48 (2010), five per day, Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5, 7 (2006), and
even six per day, Alexander, supra note 9, at 19.
211. Maximum Average Minutes Available per Matter Received, TRACIMMIGRATION
(2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/minutes.html.
212. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.37(a), 1240.13 (2012) (authorizing oral decisions).
213. LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 24, 31, 36 (2012) (characterizing insufficient support
staff, along with the EOIR’s underfunding, as the “basic problem” and recommending
proposals for change, including increasing resources and redirecting work to other agencies);
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, supra note 210, at 2-16.
214. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1652-53 (citing Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts
Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow, TRACIMMIGRATION (June 18, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/208/ ).
215. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas
for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 742 (2002).
216. Islami v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006).
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develop the factual record.217 To compound the problem, many
noncitizens appearing in court do not speak English, thus needing
translation services.218 This not only requires additional care, but
also takes up more time, as each question and each statement must
be repeated once in English and again in translation, and vice
versa.219 Finally, certain administrative tasks, like arranging for
audio recordings of hearings or keeping track of documents, also fall
on the shoulders of the immigration judge.220
The administrative record that reviewing circuit judges see on
appeal often reflects these challenges at the agency. These problems
prompted a 2006 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. In his
testimony to the Committee, Chief Judge Walker of the Second
Circuit recapped the unique problems of immigration adjudication
and urged the doubling of the number of immigration judges.221 He
testified:
I fail to see how Immigration Judges can be expected to make
thorough and competent findings of fact and conclusions of law
under these circumstances. This is especially true given the
unique nature of immigration hearings. Aliens frequently do not
speak English, so the Immigration Judge must work with a
translator, and the Immigration Judge normally must go over
particular testimony several times before he can be confident
that he is getting an accurate answer from the alien. Hearings,
particularly in asylum cases, are highly fact intensive and
depend upon the presentation and consideration of numerous
details and documents to determine issues of credibility and to
reach factual conclusions. This can take no small amount of time
depending on the nature of the alien’s testimony.222

217. Qun Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2002).
218. EOIR provides interpreters, who are either EOIR employees or contractors, if the
noncitizen lacks English proficiency. See El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. EOIR, 959 F.2d 742,
745 (9th Cir. 1991); William R. Robie, The Purpose and Effect of the Proposed Rules of
Procedure for Proceedings Before Immigration Judges, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 269, 279 (1986).
219. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1653.
220. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.28, 1003.36, 1240.9 (2012).
221. See Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 5, 7 (2006) (statement of John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/109hrg/28339.pdf.
222. Id.
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In 2007, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Carlos Bea echoed
a similar sentiment:
Last year, [Immigration Judges] decided over 350,000 matters,
or roughly 1,520 matters per judge.... Of course the[ir] opinions
are not as detailed as we appellate court judges would like, how
could they be? Of course they don’t have time to review all the
documents in the record.... I think we would see fewer appeals
if Immigration Judges were given the resources necessary to do
a detailed, thorough, thoughtful job in the first place.223

In the wake of these reports, the U.S. Department of Justice in
2006 conducted a comprehensive review of the immigration courts
and proposed twenty-two specific steps “to improve the performance
and the quality of the Immigration Courts.”224 One key proposal was
hiring more immigration judges and support staff.225 According to
one study, some temporary positions were funded in 2006 and were
subsequently made permanent.226 In addition to hiring more judges,
another proposal suggested hiring more law clerks through the
Attorney General’s Honors Program.227 In 2006, the number of
clerks was thirty-five. In 2008, that number had jumped to fifty.228
During the 2010 to 2011 fiscal year, the agency hired forty-four new
immigration judges.229 But according to one study, “[t]he number of
cases awaiting resolution before the Immigration Courts reached a
new all-time high of 275,316 by the beginning of May 2011,” and the
case backlog swelled to levels “48 percent higher than levels at the
end of” the 2008 fiscal year.230 This happened despite a recordsetting pace of new hires of immigration judges.231 Unless more is
done to curb the rising immigration case backlog, the problem will
223. Improving the Immigration Courts: Effort to Hire More Judges Falls Short,
TRACIMMIGRATION (July 28, 2008), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/189 [hereinafter
Improving the Immigration Courts].
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. New Judge Hiring Fails to Stem Rising Immigration Case Backlog, TRACIMMIGRATION (June 7, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/250.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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persist since the hiring initiative appears to be at an end.232 The
new EOIR Director, Juan P. Osunda, testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on May 18, 2011 that recruitment efforts of
immigration judges have been “cut short due to budgetary restrictions on hiring.”233 Further, Osunda anticipated the loss of about ten
immigration judges throughout each year due to “normal attrition.”234
This means that immigration judges must continue to render
quick decisions over matters that are potentially life and death for
the noncitizen without the adequate time or support to thoroughly
develop facts and review documents. If the noncitizen’s claims are
true, he risks persecution upon removal. As a result of the immense
time pressure that immigration judges face, they can render only
quick, oral decisions235 that often lack analysis and that often do not
articulate the factual predicate for the decision.236 As Judge Bea
noted in his 2007 testimony, many immigration judges’ decisions
reflect the fact that they do not even have the time to review the
entire record before rendering a decision.237 Without time to review
the entire record, judges do not have the additional time required
to research the law or current country conditions and to probe for
more factual development, which poses thorny problems in asylum
cases.238

232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Immigration judges can render either an oral decision announced in front of the
parties or a written decision served on the parties at a later date. See supra note 212.
236. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1655.
237. Improving the Immigration Courts, supra note 223.
238. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1655. The same holds true at the Board Level. In 2006,
the BIA decided more than 43,000 cases with only eleven members. Immigration Litigation
Reduction, supra note 210, at 187. This meant that each appeals member decided nearly 4,000
cases per year, which works out to around 80 cases per week. Id. Judge Walker recommended
that the number of BIA members be increased to thirty. Id. at 188. In addition, the ABA in
its report recommended hiring forty additional staff attorneys to assist the BIA. ABA HOUSE
OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 114C, at 4 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/114C.authcheckdam.pdf.
While the BIA’s overwhelming caseload has also come under strong criticism, I focus mostly
at the EOIR level for purposes of this Article because factual determinations are made by
immigration judges.
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B. Lack of Quality Representation for Noncitizens
In early 2011, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert A.
Katzmann organized about 200 leaders from government and private practice to discuss the barriers that deny many noncitizens
proper legal counsel.239 Judge Katzmann described the general lack
of representation for noncitizens in removal proceedings as a
“substantial threat to the fair and effective administration of
justice.”240 Indeed, noncitizens’ fate largely rests on whether they
can afford or find access to a lawyer.241 According to one study,
noncitizens with legal representation were five times more likely to
win their cases than those without.242 In New York, which contains
one of the busiest immigration dockets in the country, 60 percent of
detained noncitizens proceed pro se.243 According to the New York
Immigrant Representation Study, a two-year joint project of the
Vera Institute of Justice and the study group spearheaded by Judge
Katzmann,244 having legal representation was one of the two most
important variables in obtaining a successful outcome in a case,
with detention status being the other variable.245 Represented
noncitizens who are not detained have a 74 percent rate of
success.246 But unrepresented noncitizens who are also not detained
had a low success rate of only 13 percent.247 According to Judge
Katzmann, “[o]ften times, the reviewing appellate judge, who is
constrained at the time the case comes before her, is left with the
feeling that if only the immigrant had secured adequate representation at the outset, the outcome might have been different.”248
239. Sam Dolnick, Improving Immigrant Access to Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at
A24.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See id. But see Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 215, at 742 (stating that among
asylum seekers, one-third are unrepresented).
244. NEW YORK IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY, ACCESSING JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (2011) [hereinafter NYIRS],
available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_Report.pdf.
245. Id. at 3. The other variable was being free from detention. Id.
246. Id. If the represented noncitizen is detained, the success rate drops drastically to 18
percent. See id.
247. Id. If the unrepresented noncitizen is detained, the success rate drops to 3 percent. Id.
248. Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant
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One barrier to securing representation is that nearly two-thirds
of noncitizens taken into custody in a city like New York are sent
to distant detention centers in places like Texas, Louisiana, or
Pennsylvania, where representation is even more difficult to
secure.249 These detention centers are located far away from
metropolitan cities and are physically difficult to reach.250 Kenneth
Mayeaux, director of the LSU Immigration Law Clinic, states that
it takes half a day just to drive to a detention center in Louisiana
from a metropolitan city like Baton Rouge.251 This fact alone would
deter many attorneys from taking on an immigration client.252 In
such distant locations, nearly 80 percent of noncitizens go unrepresented.253
The lack of representation is just one problem; the quality of
representation is another. According to one study, federal judges
“agreed that immigration was the area in which the quality of
representation was lowest.”254 One immigration judge stated, “I’ve
grown concerned that many [immigration] attorneys are just not
very interested in their work and therefore bring little professional
vigor or focus to it.”255 According to the New York Immigration
Representation Study, about fifty-two New York immigration
attorneys have been expelled or suspended by the EOIR from the
practice of law.256 According to an official in the state attorney
general’s office, “Across New York, fraudulent legal service providers
are making huge profits by defrauding immigrant communities.”257
Poor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 9 (2008).
249. See Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 215, at 748.
250. Id.
251. Interview with Kenneth A. Mayeaux, Professor of Prof’l Practice, LSU Law Ctr. and
Dir., LSU Immigration Law Clinic, in Baton Rouge, La. (Aug. 2, 2011).
252. Id.
253. Dolnick, supra note 239, at A24; NYIRS, supra note 244, at 3.
254. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (2011).
255. Noel Brennan, A View From the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 626
(2009); see also Dolnick, supra note 239, at A24 (quoting Judge Katzmann, who said that
“[t]he too-often-poor quality of representation continues to undermine the effective
administration of justice”).
256. Preliminary Findings, NEW YORK IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY (May 3, 2011),
http://graphics8/nytimes.com/packages.pdf/nyregion/050411immigrant.pdf.
257. Dolnick, supra note 239, at A24. In addition to the poor quality of lawyers, noncitizens
are vulnerable to the predatory practices of immigration consultants, who often describe
themselves as “notarios.” See Andrew F. Moore, Fraud, the Unauthorized Practice of Law and
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Such issues have prompted immigrant groups to lobby for more
funding for programs to train lawyers and advise noncitizens of
their rights. For example, within the past year, a U.S. Department
of Justice-sponsored project called the Legal Orientation Program
opened a New York City branch to educate noncitizens of their
rights, and Justice Department authorities have stepped up efforts
to prosecute fraudulent lawyers.258 According to Fatima A. Shama,
the city’s immigrant affairs commissioner, advocates are urging
Mayor Bloomberg “to fulfill his 2009 campaign promise to spend $2
million to train lawyers.”259 But such measures appear to have
stalled due to the budgetary cuts happening at both federal and
state governments nationwide.260
An asylum applicant’s chances of a favorable outcome increase
with the presence and quality of representation because an attorney
is better able to elicit, develop, and frame the relevant facts to
support the petitioner’s claim for asylum.261 If outcomes hinge largely on representation, and immigration judges are either unable or
unwilling to make thorough findings of facts, a reviewing judge
would—and should—have less confidence in both the accuracy and
fairness of the agency proceeding.
C. Bias and Threat to Agency’s Decisional Independence
Not all criticisms of the agency stem from its under-resourcing
problem. Some raise deep concerns about the impartiality of the
fact-finder.262 For example, Lopez-Umanzor noted the immigration
judge showed “bias” and “prejudgment” against the noncitizen.263
Likewise, in Wang v. Attorney General, the panel disapproved of the
Unmet Needs: A Look at State Laws Regulating Immigration Assistants, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1, 5 (2004). These “notarios” target noncitizens from Latin American countries, where a
notario is a type of lawyer, a civil law notary. Id.
258. Dolnick, supra note 239, at A24.
259. See id.
260. See New Judge Hiring, supra note 228 (stating that DOJ cannot hire more judges
because of federal budget cuts); Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (2012), available at www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf.
261. See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
262. Islami v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (articulating an immigration judge’s
responsibility to act “as a neutral, impartial arbiter” and cautioning against assuming an
advocate’s role).
263. Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005).
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“disparagement” and “sarcasm” of the immigration judge.264 Arguably, such criticism is more serious than that concerning the
carelessness or the lack of knowledge of the pertinent law because
it calls into question the decisional independence of immigration
judges. One scholar believes that the problem is widespread.265
Another has described the problem as having reached “crisis
proportions” and urges a public campaign against the offending
immigration judges.266
While the causes of such bias may ultimately remain unknown,
some evidence suggests that structural issues within the agency
beyond the individual judges themselves may be contributing to the
problem.
A recent empirical study of immigration judges shows that
immigration judges face burnout and stress levels that are higher
than those experienced by prison wardens and emergency room
physicians.267 Immigration judges face extraordinary time pressures
and lack the essential resources to do their job properly.268 Another
important contributing factor for the high stress levels relates to the
nature of cases immigration judges decide.269 On a daily basis,
immigration judges hear distressing stories of persecution and see
noncitizens facing removal. If the judges are wrong, they risk
sending an asylum applicant back to persecution. Hearing repeated
accounts of persecution may desensitize even the most impartial
judge and over time may increase a judge’s perception of fraud.270 As
Stephen Legomsky notes, the net effect may be a vicious cycle that
contributes to even more burnout: rushed decisions reduce accuracy,
which leads to more petitions for review, which compounds the
under-resourcing problem, which over time raises more suspicion

264. 423 F.3d 260, 267-69 (3d Cir. 2005).
265. ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 12
(2009), available at http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/AssemblyLine-Injustice-Blueprint-to-Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf (“A shocking number
of examples of a lack of professionalism ... infects Immigration Court proceedings.”).
266. Alexander, supra note 9, at 45-46.
267. Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
57, 59-60 (2008).
268. See id. at 64-69.
269. Id. at 74-75.
270. Id. at 76.
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that any particular appeal is frivolous and aimed only at prolonging
the noncitizen’s stay in the United States.271
Some scholars have attributed the hostility and bias some
immigration judges have shown to the agency’s institutional structure.272 Historically, immigration judges answered to the INS, which
had significant law enforcement responsibility.273 To separate its
adjudicatory function from its enforcement one, the Justice Department in 1983 created EOIR, now the “umbrella agency that houses
both the immigration judges and the BIA.”274 The agency also
enacted regulations that require immigration judges and the BIA to
exercise “independent judgment and discretion” from the Attorney
General.275 While these two changes have ameliorated some concerns
about whether immigration judges can truly make independent
judgments and not be influenced by the agency’s enforcement
obligations, concerns still arise. For example, Legomsky describes
a high-profile case of a government prosecutor contacting the chief
immigration judge ex parte to complain about a ruling of an
immigration judge.276 The chief judge, instead of informing him to
appeal to the BIA, told the immigration judge to change his
ruling.277 Such action reflects the threat to the decisional independence of immigration judges and BIA officials, who have a duty to
impartially decide each case.
Other scholars have shown a positive correlation between
decisions made by immigration judges and BIA members and their
job security.278 In 2002, then Attorney General Ashcroft announced
that he would be cutting the number of BIA members from twentythree to eleven.279 This proposal surprised many because it was
preceded by a plan to introduce procedural shortcuts for the

271. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1656-57.
272. See Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 471
(2008) (criticizing the funding and structure of the immigration court and recommending
creation of an ethics review board); Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1667 (describing the historic
“unhealthy marriage of law enforcement and adjudicatory responsibilities” within the agency).
273. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1667.
274. Id.
275. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 1003.10(b) (2012).
276. Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1668.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., id.
279. See id.
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purported reason of reducing backlog of BIA appeals.280 A year later,
Attorney General Ashcroft announced the names of five BIA
members whom he had “reassigned” to lower positions at the
EOIR.281 This was the first such reassignment of Board members in
the BIA’s then sixty-three-year history.282 According to a study by
Peter Levinson, the “reassigned” names coincided with Board
members who had the highest percentage of rulings that favored
noncitizens.283 Levinson’s study showed that the reassigned
members included two former immigration law professors and very
senior BIA members with substantial immigration experience and
expertise.284 Moreover, the reassigned members did not necessarily
fit into the Attorney General’s stated criteria for reassignment.
Attorney General Ashcroft set specific guidelines for gauging which
judges should retain their post: those qualities were “integrity,”
“professional competence,” “adjudicatorial temperament,” indicators
of “experience,” and the like.285 These qualities appear not to have
played a role in many cases.
Equally significant is the impact that such reassignment had on
BIA decision making. When Levinson compared the decisions of
Board members before and after the reassignment, several Board
members who were more inclined to rule in favor of noncitizens
suddenly issued fewer rulings favoring noncitizens.286 Similarly,
another study that compared Board decisions before and after the
reassignment revealed an increase in affirmance rates of adverse
rulings against noncitizens.287 Although these studies do not conclu280. See id.
281. Id. at 1668-69.
282. Id. at 1669.
283. See Peter J. Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration
Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1155-56 (2004); Ricardo AlonsoZaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to Leave, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2003, at A16.
284. Levinson, supra note 283, at 1155.
285. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 1003 (2012)).
286. See Levinson, supra note 283, at 1156-60.
287. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 27-28,
available at www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA.pdf; Alexander, supra note 9, at
12 (showing that board decisions in favor of noncitizens fell 15 percent); Jaya Ramji-Nogales
et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 358-59
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sively prove a causal relationship between the increase in adverse
rulings against noncitizens and Attorney General Ashcroft’s decision
to reassign BIA members, the studies provide compelling circumstantial evidence of the threats to decisional independence posed by
executive control of agencies and indicate that factors beyond the
merits of each case may considerably influence agency members’
decisions.
D. Procedural Shortcuts at the BIA
In addition to reassigning BIA members, Attorney General
Ashcroft instituted a procedure to streamline appeals at the BIA
level for the purported reason of reducing backlog. He implemented
the streamlining measures in 2002.288 One measure that has
received the most vocal criticism allowed the BIA to affirm the
rulings of immigration judges without opinion.289 Under this plan,
the BIA could not issue any reasoning or opinion for its ruling.290
Attorney General Ashcroft made this plan the “primacy of the
streamlining system for the majority of the cases,” as this system
became the norm rather than the exception.291 Although only 5
percent of all cases are now decided under this plan, it does not
mean the BIA issues detailed reasoning for its other opinions.292
Indeed, as Judge Walker testified, “short opinions by single
members are now the dominant form of decision making.... [T]hey
can be as short as two or three sentences, even when the issues
would appear to merit a longer discussion.”293
The other major structural change Attorney General Ashcroft
initiated was to move to a single-judge appellate review instead of
a decision by a three-member panel.294 Regulations limit three-

(2005) (showing decrease in favorable remands in asylum decisions between 2000 and 2003).
288. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management,
67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 1003).
289. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (authorizing affirmance without opinion).
290. See id.
291. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. at 54,878.
292. See Legomsky, supra note 12, at 1657.
293. See id. at 1657 (quoting COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, supra note 210, at ES-32).
294. See COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, supra note 210, at 3-26.
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member review to only a few circumstances.295 This shift to a singlemember review may result in a less thorough review. Given the time
pressures under which immigration judges issue their rulings, a less
thorough review at the BIA level means a greater likelihood that
errors will escape the review process. Moreover, a single-judge
model of review leaves less room for legal debate and disagreement
among judges that would enhance legal reasoning and could lead to
more accurate decision making. Indeed, some studies have documented that a greater likelihood of less favorable rulings for
noncitizens exists when review occurs under a single-member
review as opposed to a panel review.296 According to a 2008 GAO
Report, only 7 percent of single-member judgments favored noncitizens, whereas 52 percent of panel decisions favored noncitizens.297
These procedural shortcuts raise serious questions about the
accuracy of the agency’s factual determinations and whether
noncitizens get a fair shake at the agency level. If immigration
judges do not have the necessary time and resources to do a
thorough job in the first place, and the BIA institutes procedures
to short-circuit the intra-agency review process, then there is a
greater likelihood of errors at the agency level. To make matters
worse, the Board in 2002 changed not only the means by which
immigration judge decisions are reviewed but also the nature of that
review when it curbed its scope of review from de novo review to
clearly erroneous.298 The clearly erroneous standard is the same
standard that appellate courts employ to evaluate factual findings
by district courts.299 Thus, it is a highly deferential standard of
295. The six circumstances are:
(1) the need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration
judges; (2) the need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws,
regulations, or procedures; (3) the need to review a decision by an immigration
judge or the Service that is not in conformity with the law or with applicable
precedents; (4) the need to resolve a case or controversy of major national
import; (5) the need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an
immigration judge; or (6) the need to reserve the decision of an immigration
judge or the Service, other than a reversal under § 1003.1(e)(5).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(i)-(vi) (2010).
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard
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review. But an appellate court defers to the district court, in part,
because of assurance that the procedures employed there and the
judicial process provided to the parties satisfy the standard of
justice.
Given the crushing caseloads and extreme time pressures under
which immigration judges operate, the same logic does not apply to
the immigration agency. The clear error standard shields the Board
from exercising much-needed oversight to ensure that through its
review an individual would not be harmed by an immigration
judge’s mistakes. And coupled with the switch to single-member
review and the lack of meaningful analysis by the BIA, a reasonable perception is that the BIA is merely “rubber stamping” the
decisions of immigration judges, however flawed some of them may
be.300 The effect of these changes is to cast doubt on whether any
meaningful review happens at the agency. Arguably, the first
meaningful review of an immigration judge’s decision happens at
the federal courts of appeals. Though the ideal solution would put
more meaningful review at the agency level where it belongs, the
agency’s unwillingness or incapacity to do so means circuit judges
must have the necessary latitude to review agency decisions more
searchingly to catch errors and remand for more accurate factfinding.
III. INAPPLICABLE ASSUMPTIONS UNDER THE SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE STANDARD
My argument for less deferential appellate review of agency factfinding in asylum cases does not rest only on the agency’s current
capabilities. If it did, more searching review might be only temporarily required—until Congress properly supported the agency with
resources that could “cure” its current problems. Unfortunately,
however, additional resources would not wholly allay many concerns
related to appellate review. Many of the traditional assumptions
that counsel deference to agencies simply do not apply with much
force to immigration agencies.

to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”).
300. See supra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
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A. Comparative Advantage
1. Live Testimony Advantage
One reason why appellate judges defer to trial judges on findings
of fact is because the trial judge is in a better position than the
appellate judge to come to a conclusion about factual questions. The
trial judge sees the presentation of the evidence live. Therefore, he
or she has access to a defendant’s or witness’s demeanor—whether
the person appears nervous or makes eye contact, as well as other
nonverbal cues that an appellate judge cannot discern from
reading a transcript of the proceeding.301 Such nonverbal cues are
critical in a trial judge’s determination of whether a particular
defendant or witness was or was not credible. This relationship of
direct interaction to credibility—and thus generally more accurate
fact-finding—explains why appellate judges review a trial judge’s
findings of fact under the clear error standard, under which a trial
judge’s findings of fact must stand unless clearly erroneous.302 This
means that if there are two reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from a particular fact, and the trial judge draws one such inference
and the reviewing judge would draw the other inference, then the
trial judge’s inference cannot be clearly wrong and the reviewing
judge cannot override it.303
The same rationale undergirds deference to an administrative
finding of fact. An administrative fact-finder, like a trial judge, is
theoretically in a better position to judge the credibility of a live
witness and make assessments as to the related facts. According to
Justice Breyer, reviewing judges should give even more deference
to an administrative fact-finder than to a trial judge.304 But it is not
clear why the review should be more deferential under the substan301. See Green, supra note 43, at 4.
302. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007).
303. Cf. Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Under [the clear
error] standard, we can overturn factual findings that we conclude are clearly wrong even
though they are not unreasonable.”).
304. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 156 (1999) (concluding that the clear error
standard is stricter than the substantial evidence standard of review, which “signal[s] less
strict court/agency review”); see also Menendez-Donis, 360 F.3d at 918 (“[U]nder the
substantial evidence standard we cannot substitute our determination for that of the
administrative fact-finder just because we believe that the fact-finder is clearly wrong.”).
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tial evidence standard than under the clear error standard. On this
factor alone, the deference accorded an administrative fact-finder
should be equal to and no more deferential than the deference
reviewing judges accord an Article III trial judge. An administrative
fact-finder is in no better position to know that someone is lying
than a trial judge: in both cases deference relates to the direct
observation of the witness’s demeanor and other nonverbal cues.305
This appears to be the position that Chief Judge Jacob endorsed in
Siewe when he concluded that, under the substantial evidence
standard, a reviewing court must accord “no lesser deference to an
[immigration judge] than to a district judge when each draws
inferences from the evidence as a finder of fact.”306
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that, in some respects, an
immigration judge may enjoy little comparative advantage over an
appellate judge, and reliance on nonverbal cues may actually undermine accurate fact-finding. Concerning credibility determinations,
which are “the most crucial aspect”307 of an asylum case and “‘the
single biggest substantive hurdle’ facing asylum applicants,”308 Chief
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit made the
following observation:
Asylum cases pose thorny challenges in evaluating testimony.
Applicants regularly tell horrific stories that, if true, show past
persecution and a risk of worse to come.... Most claims of
persecution can be neither confirmed nor refuted by documentary evidence. Even when it is certain that a particular incident
occurred, there may be doubt about whether a given alien was
among the victims. Then the alien’s oral narration must stand
or fall on its own terms. Yet many aliens, who want to remain in
the United States for economic or social reasons unrelated to
persecution, try to deceive immigration officials. Often they are
coached by friends or organizations that disapprove of this
nation’s restrictions on immigration and do what they can to
help others remain here. Occasionally, the coaches (like smug-

305. An administrative fact-finder may theoretically have greater expertise over the facts
he or she may be considering. Therefore, administrative fact-finding may deserve greater
deference. I address this argument in Part III.B.
306. Siewe, 480 F.3d at 168.
307. Rempell, supra note 8, at 186-87 (quoting Cianciarulo, supra note 8, at 126).
308. Id. at 187 (quoting Kagan, supra note 8, at 368).
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glers who provide transportation and bogus credentials) do this
for pay rather than out of friendship or commitment. How is an
immigration judge to sift honest, persecuted aliens from those
who are feigning?309

Empirical evidence in psychology supports Judge Easterbrook’s view
that in matters of credibility, certainty is not possible.310 Contrary
to popular belief, attention to a witness’s demeanor is not a reliable
method for spotting a liar.311 Such unreliability would be magnified
in the immigration context due to the role of cultural differences.
Immigration judges see noncitizens from a variety of cultures, thus
it may be difficult to draw a general conclusion about whether a
particular mannerism or demeanor signifies lying. For example,
avoiding eye contact when speaking, which indicates dishonesty in
some cultures, would not necessarily imply that the person is being
untruthful in others. Avoidance of eye contact might indicate
deference to authority or be another relatively meaningless nonverbal cue or trait. Instead, research shows that what someone says,
instead of how it is said, is a more reliable indicator of dishonesty.312
Thus, factual inconsistencies and the amount of detail provided in
a story are what more accurately distinguish a truth-teller from a
fibber.313 But even then, the error rate is significant.314 If factual
consistencies and the amount of detail in a story are more reliable
indicators of the truth than one’s demeanor, then reviewing judges
are equally positioned to discern fact from fiction from a hearing
transcript. Arguably, they may be in a better position to accurately

309. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (2008); see also Suketu Mehta, The Asylum
Seeker, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2011, at 32, 36-37 (documenting incentives for asylum
applicants to augment their claims of persecution).
310. Kagan, supra note 14, at 129-36 (examining evidence in psychology and other social
science research that cast serious doubt about the utility of demeanor in assessing truth from
fiction).
311. See RICHARD WISEMAN, QUIRKOLOGY: HOW WE DISCOVER THE BIG TRUTHS IN SMALL
THINGS 54-56 (2007).
312. Stephen Porter & John C. Yuille, The Language of Deceit: An Investigation of the
Verbal Cues to Deception in the Interrogation Context, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 443 (1996);
Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 243, 263-64 (1988).
313. See WISEMAN, supra note 311, at 58-59.
314. See id. at 58.
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assess truth from fiction because they are not influenced by
potentially misleading nonverbal cues.315
2. Procedures Employed at Article III Courts Versus at Agencies
The INA does not specify the procedure for adjudicating claims
for asylum. Instead, statutory provisions and agency regulations fill
that gap. Compared to district court hearings, the procedures in
removal hearings that assist in an accurate development of the
facts are scant. Unlike at the district court level, there are no
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Federal Rules of Evidence to
guide and safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process.316
There is often no formal discovery process to develop and test
facts.317 The INA merely specifies that the immigration judge shall
“interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.”318 But as argued above, developing the necessary facts
through testimony and cross-examination of witnesses can be
challenging for the significant portion of asylum-seekers who
proceed without representation.319 In such an environment, a
reviewing judge would have greater confidence in the accuracy of
the facts found by the Article III judge versus an immigration judge.

315. See Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1997) (Duniway,
J., dissenting) (“Every trial lawyer knows, and most trial judges will admit, that it is not
unusual for an accomplished liar to fool a jury (or, even, heaven forbid, a trial judge) into
believing him because his demeanor is so convincing. The expression of his countenance may
be open and frank; he may sit squarely in the chair, with no squirming; he may show no
nervousness; his answers to questions may be clear, concise, and audible, and given without
hesitation; his coloration may be normal—neither pale nor flushed. In short, he may appear
to be the trial lawyer’s ideal witness. He may also be a consummate liar.”).
316. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern ... civil actions and proceedings in the
United States District Courts.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Likewise, the Federal Rules of Evidence
govern proceedings in United States District Courts, as well as other federal courts. FED. R.
EVID. 101.
317. Limited discovery is possible. In particular, regulations authorize depositions and
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. See FOIA, 6 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-5.12 (2012); FOIA, 8
C.F.R. §§ 103.42, 1003.35 (depositions). The IJ has some discretion to hold a pre-hearing conference, during which parties can “exchange information voluntarily.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.21(a).
318. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006).
319. See supra Part II.B.
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B. Agency Expertise
Another reason why reviewing courts accord deference to agency
findings is the assumption that agencies possess expertise that
judges do not.320 One of the earliest cases to articulate this principle
was Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.321
There, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the substantial
evidence standard in the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Taft-Hartley Act.322 Though the Court emphasized that the substantial evidence standard gives courts “more responsibility for the
reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions than some
courts have shown in the past,”323 it also stated that courts cannot
“displace the [agency]’s choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice
had the matter been before it de novo.”324 The Court concluded that
the reason for deference to an agency’s finding of fact is to respect
an agency’s “specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within
that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not
possess and therefore must respect.”325
The same expertise rationale motivated Justice Breyer’s opinion
in Zurko.326 Justice Breyer rejected the adoption of the less deferential clear error standard of review for administrative factual finding.
He did not, however, focus on the comparative advantage rationale
for deference327—for example, observation of witnesses. Rather, he
asserted that the Patent and Trademark Office’s expertise comes
from its ability to deal with technically complex matters.328 Justice
Breyer stated that the Court first used the term “substantial
evidence” in the agency context to review factual findings made by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Reviewing the Federal
Circuit’s cases, he concluded that in more than half of the cases

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999).
340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
See id.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 157 (1999).
See discussion supra Part III.A.
Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 160.
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the Federal Circuit329 decided between 1937 and 1946, the court
emphasized technical complexity as the primary reason for deference.330
Although not cited by Justice Breyer in Chevron,331 which directs
the level of deference applied to agency legal determinations, looms
large over all appellate review of agency action.332 The Supreme
Court has reiterated in several cases that Chevron applies in
immigration cases.333 Though in theory Chevron does not constrain
a judge’s review of the agency’s findings of fact, in reality Chevron
deference operates as a curb on judicial review over factual
findings.334 Indeed, the technical expertise rationale Justice Breyer
gave for why courts need to defer to an agency’s fact-finding echoes
Chevron.335
In Chevron, the Court articulated the expertise rationale for
deference to agencies, a rationale often debated by judges and
scholars alike.336 The case concerned a disputed interpretation of the
phrase “stationary source” in the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments.337
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which administers the
329. The Court refers here to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which was
the predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See id. at 154.
330. See id. at 161.
331. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
332. John S. Kane, Refining Chevron—Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Religious
Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 520 (2008) (describing Chevron as “the keystone in the
Court’s jurisprudence of appellate review of agency action”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809
(2002) (characterizing Chevron as “the Court’s most important decision about the most
important issue in modern administrative law”).
333. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (stating that Chevron applies
to asylum and withholding cases); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987)
(invoking Chevron to reverse the BIA’s interpretation of the meaning of the asylum and
withholding of deportation statute in the INA).
334. See Maureen B. Callahan, Judicial Review of Agency Legal Determinations in Asylum
Cases, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 773, 775, 786-88 (1992); Jonathan Robert Nelson, Shaking the
Pillars: An Asylum Applicant Shakes Loose Some Unusual Relief, INTERPRETER RELEASES,
Jan. 3, 2006, at 1-3 (explaining that in Xiaodong Li v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 500, 503-04 (5th Cir.
2005), the Fifth Circuit reluctantly upheld the BIA’s decision to deny Li asylum under
Chevron deference, a case that generated so much political pressure that it led the Attorney
General to take the unprecedented step to ask the court to vacate its initial ruling).
335. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 160 (1999) (noting that the PTO, as an “expert
body,” can “better deal with the technically complex subject matter” than can a judge).
336. See Kane, supra note 332, at 520 (describing Chevron as “the most cited and discussed
case in the history of administrative law”).
337. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845-46 (1984).
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statute, concluded that because the Clean Air Act did not define the
statute it had authority under the Environmental Protection Act to
promulgate a rule interpreting the phrase broadly.338 The D.C. Circuit
disagreed and interpreted the phrase narrowly because of its view
that the statute so mandated.339 The Supreme Court disagreed. It
narrowed the judicial role to determining whether Congress
expressed a clear intent concerning the meaning of the statutory
term. If a court cannot determine a clear congressional intent, then
its role is to defer to an agency’s interpretation, as long as it is
reasonable.340
The Court named several reasons to defer to agencies. One was
political accountability.341 Because the consequence of choosing
between two interpretations of the statutory text boiled down to
balancing the conflicting policy interests of environmental protection and economic growth, the Court stated that federal judges “who
have no constituency [ ] have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do.”342 Another reason was the Court’s
view that Congress delegated authority, albeit implicitly, to agencies to interpret the statutes they administer.343 Yet another reason
was the expertise rationale. Because the regulatory scheme at issue
in Chevron was both complex and technical, the Court deferred to
the agency’s “detailed and reasoned fashion,” stating that “[j]udges
are not experts in the field.”344
Some scholars have argued against Chevron’s expertise rationale.
In Chevron, the Court deferred to the agency because the statute
was “lengthy, detailed, technical, [and] complex.”345 According to
John Kane, this rationale obfuscates the role of courts; just because
the subject matter a court is required to understand is technical
338. Id. at 840, 841; 40 C.F.R. §§ 51-52 (1981).
339. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841-42.
340. Id. at 842-43.
341. Id. at 866.
342. Id.
343. See id. at 843-44; Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1085-89 (tracing the developments in Chevron deference).
344. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, 865; cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735,
743 (2002) (discussing the Court’s justification for its holding in Chevron on the expertise
rationale, but concluding that the decision ultimately turned an implied congressional
delegation).
345. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 848.
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does not mean that the choice courts make is itself technical and
outside of the province of judicial expertise.346 Both the Chevron and
pre-Chevron frameworks require the agency to explain its decision
in a way that a reviewing court can understand so that the court can
determine whether the agency’s decision was reasonable.347 Kane
argues that courts are better able to come to an informed choice
about an issue, however technical, once agencies satisfy their duty
of explaining the issue for a reviewing court.348 “Exercising judgment is generally the area of judges’” expertise, not necessarily
administrators’ or technicians’.349 Even if Congress intended for
courts to simply defer to an agency’s judgment about matters that
are technical, the expertise rationale applies with significantly less
force in the immigration context. Understanding the statute in
Chevron required expertise of a scientific nature.350 Though the kind
of expertise required to understand the patent statute in Zurko was
not scientific, it was complex in a technical sense.351 The INA, while
complicated in scope, is neither scientific nor technical.352 It
resembles any other complicated statute that Article III judges
interpret on a daily basis.
It may be that agencies possess expertise not only in the sense
that they have the technical or scientific understanding over the
material but also in the sense that they develop a specialty over the
subject matter by the exclusive nature of their practice. The
argument goes as follows: the EPA, as the administrator of the
Clean Air Act, is in a better position to interpret the meaning of a
particular term in a statute it administers than an Article III court
346. Kane, supra note 332, at 552.
347. Id. at 352 n.201. Kane also cites pre-Chevron law that requires an agency to explain
in reasonable detail both the substance and method of the agency’s decision. See id.; see, e.g.,
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(concluding that an agency decision may be upheld for lacking clarity if the reasoning can be
discerned by a reviewing court).
348. Kane, supra note 332, at 552.
349. Id. Chevron was also predicated on a political accountability rationale, which may
counsel in favor of deferring to the policy choices made by an agency. See infra Part III.C.
350. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“The Administrator’s interpretation represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competitive interests and is entitled to deference:
the regulatory scheme is technical and complex.”).
351. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 160 (1998) (describing the subject matter as
“technically complex”).
352. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (2006).

632

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:581

because the EPA has interpreted that term more often than a judge
and can bring to bear its superior knowledge of the statute generally. Article III judges practice in courts of general jurisdiction and,
by that very nature, are less likely to develop expertise in a
particular area of the law.353 Likewise, the BIA may be more of an
expert on the meaning of the term “persecution” in the INA because
it deals with the term on a frequent basis in the course of administering the statute. An immigration judge may be in a better position
to tell whether an asylum applicant is lying because the judge sees
hundreds of such applicants and is better able to distinguish one
who shows a genuine fear of persecution from another who may be
lying. But as discussed in Part II.C, this frequency may not result
in accuracy. It may actually undermine it.354 Immigration judges
who absorb only a constant stream of stories of persecution are more
likely to face post-traumatic stress disorder.355 Recurrent accounts
of persecution may lead to unwarranted perception of fraud and, as
various circuit judges have noted, a tendency for prejudgment,
hostility towards noncitizens, and an inaccurate assessment of the
facts.356
Further, circuit judges’ sharp critiques of the significant mistakes made by IJs and BIA members actually challenge the claim
that the BIA and the IJs possess greater expertise than the circuit
courts on immigration matters.357 During the last decade, the
353. Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Making: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109,
114-15 (1997) (discussing the nature of Article III judges as generalists).
354. See supra Part II.C.
355. Lustig et al., supra note 267, at 73-75.
356. Id. at 76-77 (describing IJs’ perceptions of fraud in their courtrooms); see Qun Wang
v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he tone, the tenor, and disparagement, and
the sarcasm of the [immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court television show.”);
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he IJ’s opinion is riddled with
inappropriate and extraneous comments, such as reference to the IJ’s personal experiences
with alcohol in Egypt.”); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding
that the IJ’s “hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive” conduct towards the petitioner “by itself
would require a rejection of his credibility finding”); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he [immigration judge’s] assessment of Petitioner’s credibility
was skewed by prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture.”); Korytynuk v.
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is the IJ’s conclusion, not [the petitioner’s]
testimony, that ‘strains credulity.’”).
357. See, e.g., Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law:
Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1109-11 (2011)
(discussing critiques often made about the decisions of IJs and the BIA).
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number of immigration cases in the federal circuit courts has
increased exponentially.358 In 2005, close to 40% of the Second
Circuit’s docket was immigration cases.359 The Ninth Circuit was not
far behind. Between 35% and 40% of the two circuits’ dockets have
been immigration cases in recent years.360 These numbers alone
would require circuit judges to become familiar with the INA and
substantive immigration law. Moreover, the structural changes
made at the BIA to streamline review have increased circuit judges’
expertise in immigration law while decreasing the BIA’s.361 Even in
non-streamlined cases, the BIA provides so little, if any, reasoning
of its decisions that some have questioned whether an IJ decision
affirmed without opinion by the BIA should be accorded Chevron
deference at all by the circuit court.362 In a similar vein, Judge
Posner has commented that in many cases, the BIA “is not deploying any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating
immigration cases.”363 Finally, the empirical evidence in psychology
358. See, e.g., Note, Recent Cases, Immigration Law—Administrative Adjudication—Third
and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration Courts—Wang v. Attorney
General, 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005), and Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir.
2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2596 (2006) (stating that immigration cases have “swollen in
the past five years from three percent to eighteen percent of all federal appeals”).
359. Elizabeth Cronin, When the Deluge Hits and You Never Saw the Storm: Asylum
Overload and the Second Circuit, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 551-52 (2007).
360. Rempell, supra note 8, at 187.
361. See, e.g., Cronin, supra note 359, at 552-53 (outlining the Second Circuit’s steps to
accommodate its increased caseload). As argued previously, the egregious errors committed
by BIA members and IJs raise significant concerns about their expertise. See, e.g., Ayala v.
Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 943, 951 (11th Cir. 2010) (remanding to the BIA because “[t]he
decision of the Board is riddled with error” and the BIA and IJ “fail[ed] to render a reasoned
decision”); Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010) (remanding to the BIA for a
second time because “the Board’s conclusion [that denationalization alone does not constitute
persecution] doesn’t follow from its premise, and unlike a jury an administrative agency has
to provide a reasoned justification for its rulings”); Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 471, 480
(6th Cir. 2009) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“This record is replete with error.”); Bah v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are deeply disturbed by what we perceive to be fairly
obvious errors in the agency’s application of its own regulatory framework.... The claims of
the petitioners before us, as set forth below, did not receive the type of careful analysis they
were due.”).
362. Farbenblum, supra note 357, at 1112 n.295 (quoting Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279,
289 (3d Cir. 2004) (“If ... an individual Board member arbitrarily ... streamlines a case where
no Board or binding precedent accepts or rejects an alien’s plausible interpretation of an
ambiguous statute, we are then left to interpret the statute without the BIA having provided
its Chevron deference-entitled ‘concrete meaning’ to an ambiguous statute.”)).
363. Wei Cong Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004).
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shows that accuracy and certainty may not even be possible in
credibility determinations.364 Such findings cast further doubt on the
possibility that the immigration agency can bring to bear or develop
expertise in its immigration proceedings in the same way that the
EPA can over scientific matters.365
Other measures show that an Article III judge may be more
“expert” than an immigration judge at discerning truth from fiction.
One way judges develop this skill is through their experience in
hearing cases. Judges who are appointed to the federal bench
undergo a rigorous selection and confirmation process that tests
their professional background, legal experience, and judicial temperament.366 Judges appointed to the appellate bench usually have
years of experience hearing cases that would engender confidence
in their skill in exercising sound judgment. Comparatively, the
hiring process for immigration judges is not as rigorous, and
immigration judges generally possess less legal experience than
Article III judges.367
Recent reports that have exposed the illegal hiring of immigration judges at the Department of Justice (DOJ) beginning in 2003
also undercut the credibility of some immigration judges and the
integrity of their decisions.368 In his testimony to Congress, Kyle
Sampson, who was then Chief of Staff in the DOJ Office of the
Attorney General and in charge of hiring immigration judges, stated
that until 2006, he believed that the appointment of immigration
judges was not subject to the civil service laws that prohibited
hiring based on political affiliation.369 Under Sampson, the EOIR did
not post or fill vacancies for immigration judge positions without
communicating those vacancies to Sampson and the Office of the
See supra notes 308-15 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 353, at 115.
See id.
PENN STATE LAW, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION RIGHTS, PLAYING POLITICS AT THE BENCH: A
WHITE PAPER ON THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S INVESTIGATION INTO THE HIRING PRACTICES OF
IMMIGRATION JUDGES 23 (2009); see Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch, Administrative
Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2195 (2011) (concluding that
today—unlike during the New Deal when an agency’s expertise was more scientific—agency
decisions reflect more political, not scientific considerations, and that agency decisions may
reflect “‘tunnel vision,’ an agency’s supreme confidence in the importance of its own mission
to the point where it leaves common sense aside”).
369. Id. at 17, 25.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
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Attorney General.370 Sampson himself asked for names of potential
candidates from the White House and Republican members of
Congress.371 Even with those sources, he confirmed candidates’
Republican Party affiliation by having them fill out a PPO NonCareer Appointment Form. That form required candidates to name
their political party affiliation, voting address for the past two
presidential elections, involvement in the Bush/Cheney campaigns
of 2000 and 2004, and the contact information for someone who
could verify the candidate’s political involvement.372
Notwithstanding the illegality of taking political affiliation into
account in civil service hiring, hiring judges on the basis of political
affiliation—Democratic, Republican or third party—neglects the
criteria necessary to do the job, chiefly, judicial experience and
experience in immigration law.373 Although the EOIR has implemented changes to improve the process of hiring immigration
judges,374 according to the ABA, there is still the lack of transparency and public input in the hiring of immigration judges that
would ensure that applicants with inadequate backgrounds or
inappropriate judicial temperament are not hired.375 Such realities
show why the expertise rationale for deference is particularly
unconvincing in the immigration context.
C. Political Accountability
The Supreme Court in Chevron articulated political accountability of agencies as a significant reason why courts need to defer to
agency choices and their resolution of competing views involving
matters of public interest.376 This was based on the view that
370. Id. at 28.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. See COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, supra note 210, at 2-10 (stating the importance
of hiring immigration judges with adequate experience and appropriate judicial
temperament).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 2-18 to 2-19.
376. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 867, 866 (1984) (“The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: ‘Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches.’” (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 195 (1978))).
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Congress and the President, who create and appoint agency
members, are democratically elected, while Article III judges are
not.377 Congress created agencies to make tough policy choices that
arise under a particular statute; therefore, we should respect agency
choices.378 But this reason for deference was limited to policy choices
made by agencies, not their factual determinations.379 Therefore, the
political accountability rationale does not apply to fact-finding in
individual asylum cases.
Even if fact-finding could be closely aligned with policy determinations, the political accountability rationale is itself unconvincing
in the asylum context. Agency personnel are no more democratically elected than are Article III judges.380 One difference is that
agency personnel are appointed by the President and the agency is
created by Congress—both are publicly elected. Therefore, agency
personnel are arguably more answerable to the political process
than Article III judges.381 But an agency member’s connection to the
political process is attenuated at best.382 The EPA, according to the
Court in Chevron, is not directly accountable to the public either,
but it is theoretically accountable through the President.383 In
practice, though, it would be rare for an agency adjudicator’s
decision in individual cases to result in political accountability,
especially so in the immigration context.384 Even under the theoretical assumption that the public could somehow hold the Attorney
General accountable for the decisions of the BIA and IJs, the reality
is that decisions by the BIA and IJs—and the procedures employed
to arrive at those decisions—are not publicly available.385 In fact,
most of the decisions the BIA and IJs make are unpublished, further
insulating them from public accountability.386
377. Id.
378. Id. at 865-66.
379. See id.
380. But see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761,
762 (“Scholars have widely endorsed Chevron and especially the principle of [agency] political
accountability on which it rests.”).
381. Kane, supra note 332, at 563.
382. Id. (noting that the agency officials are “indirectly” answerable to elected officials).
383. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
384. Kane, supra note 332, at 563 (wondering when the last time an agency adjudicator’s
decision resulted in political accountability).
385. Farbenblum, supra note 357, at 1108.
386. Id. at 1109.
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D. Finality: Akin to Jury Verdicts?
Another argument for greater deference under the substantial
evidence standard is the value of the finality of administrative
decisions. Indeed, this argument motivated Justice Breyer’s holding
in Zurko. There, he described congressional debates concerning the
meaning of the substantial evidence standard that reveal that
Congress explicitly rejected the clear error standard for administrative fact-finding in order to give more finality to administrative factfinders.387 To support his view, he cited Stern’s law review article,
which goes as far as to argue that the substantial evidence standard
used to review an administrative fact-finding is “identical” to the
standard appellate courts apply in reviewing jury verdicts.388 We
accord deference to a jury verdict, in part, because it is intended to
be final.
The contention that an administrative fact-finder’s conclusions
merit the same deference as that of a jury is unconvincing, however.
In at least two respects, we accord more deference to a jury’s verdict
than an administrator’s fact-finding. The Supreme Court has said
that a reviewing court must take into account the administrative
record as a whole and must consider evidence that detracts from the
fact-finder’s conclusion.389 In contrast, a court reviewing a jury
verdict must draw every possible inference in favor of a jury
verdict.390 Second, unlike a jury, an administrative fact-finder must
provide reasons for her decision. Indeed, under SEC v. Chenery
Corp., an administrative fact-finder must explain her reasoning
with “such clarity as to be understandable.”391 A jury has no
obligation to explain the reasons for its decision. That difference
is especially acute in the review of an adverse credibility determination. When an appellate court reviews a jury’s credibility
determination, it must disregard all evidence that is “favorable to
the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.”392 This
387.
388.
389.
390.
(2000).
391.
392.

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 156 (1999).
Stern, supra note 158, at 74, 76.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).
FED. R. CIV. P. 50; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.
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means that the reviewing court must defer almost entirely to a
jury’s factual determination. But the substantial evidence standard
allows a reviewing court to review an administrative fact-finder’s
credibility determinations more strictly than the findings of a jury.
While the finality of agency decisions is an important goal, it should
not be the exclusive goal—particularly in light of evidence that casts
serious doubt on the competence of the fact-finding process at the
agency.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The critiques by circuit judges have shed necessary light on the
deficiencies of asylum adjudication and have renewed talks for
agency reform. Scholars have recommended proposals ranging
from incremental changes at the agency to a drastic overhaul of
the entire asylum adjudication system.
An example of the former approach is Scott Rempell’s recommendation to broaden the BIA’s scope of review over immigration judge
decisions.393 Before the 2002 reforms, the BIA had the authority to
review IJ decisions de novo, including over factual findings.394 As
explained in Part II.D, under the 2002 regulations, the BIA must
review findings of fact under the highly deferential clearly erroneous standard of review.395 The effect of the change in the standard
of review is that it gives the BIA much less discretion to overturn
IJ factual findings. Though it is not particularly unusual to defer to
a trier of fact, who has some comparative advantage over a reviewing court,396 a reviewing court could interpret greater deference as
mandating an altogether less thorough review. As applied to the
BIA, this is a plausible inference. The change in standard of review
coincided with the BIA’s institution of other procedural shortcuts,
such as moving from a three-judge panel review to single-member
review and streamlining decisions.
393. Scott Rempell, The Board of Immigration Appeals’ Standard of Review: An Argument
for Regulatory Reform, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 283, 321 (2011).
394. Id. at 285 (citing In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 463-64 (B.I.A. 2002)); see also In re
Vilanova-Gonzalez, 13 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (B.I.A. 1969); In re B-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A.
1956).
395. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2012).
396. See supra Part III.A.
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The cumulative effect of these changes is a less thorough review
of immigration judges’ decisions. If less attention is paid to each
case within the agency, then the court of appeals is the first level of
meaningful review. Reinstituting de novo review of immigration
judges’ decisions would be an incremental improvement leading to
more meaningful review at the agency level. It would give reviewing
judges confidence that the fact-finding process had been accurate at
the agency level.397
An example of a more drastic approach is Stephen Legomsky’s
recommendation to overhaul the entire immigration adjudication
system.398 Legomsky proposes giving more decisional independence
to immigration judges by moving them from the Department of
Justice into a new independent executive branch tribunal.399 He also
advocates converting immigration judges to administrative law
judges, which would give them more job security and give them the
resources necessary to do their jobs more effectively.400 For the
appellate phase, Legomsky recommends a single round of appeal
outside of the agency done by Article III judges instead of BIA
members.401 But that appeal would be done in a new immigration
court, with experienced Article III district and circuit judges serving
two-year assignments.402 By giving Article III judges more oversight
over immigration judges, Legomsky argues that the new system
would depoliticize asylum adjudication.403 Moreover, a new Article
III court would preserve the specialized expertise of immigration
law and also provide a generalist’s perspective.404 Legomsky’s
proposal would provide more independent oversight during the
appellate process. Removing immigration judges from the Justice
Department would reduce the likelihood of political pressure on
decision making and would more likely ensure fairer outcomes.
While Legomsky’s solution is feasible, it may ultimately prove
politically elusive, like many other proposals to reform the immigra397. Rempell also discusses other reasons why regulatory reform should reinstitute the de
novo standard. See Rempell, supra note 393, at 319.
398. See generally Legomsky, supra note 12.
399. See id. at 1678.
400. See id. at 1681-82.
401. See id. at 1714.
402. See id. at 1715.
403. See id. at 1721.
404. See id. at 1680-81.
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tion adjudication system. For years, many commentators and
scholars have articulated proposals to reform the immigration
system without any resulting action or even political or public
consensus. With the current budget crisis405 and the partisan
political climate, a drastic change in the administration of the
immigration system is unlikely in the near future. If the agency
cannot do more to ensure a more accurate fact-finding process by IJs
and if the BIA does not institute procedures for more thorough
review, errors will continue and will escape review by the BIA. Lack
of proper oversight from reviewing court of appeals judges increases
the risk of an asylum petitioner returning to a foreign country to
face persecution.406 Until enough resources and political will exist to
make the necessary changes to the agency below, court of appeals
judges should embrace the latitude they have under the substantial
evidence standard to inquire into the fact-finding process to ensure
that mistakes are caught.
A. The Legal Basis for “Stricter” Review
Courts have iterated the substantial evidence standard in a
variety of ways in a variety of contexts. Examples include: “more
than a mere scintilla”407 (reviewing action of Social Security
Administration); “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence, and must be based upon the record taken as a
whole”408 (Department of Agriculture); “less than a preponderance,
but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion”409 (Social Security);
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to accept a conclusion”410 (county planning commission and
board); agency findings “may not be disregarded on the basis that
405. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
406. See Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2006).
407. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
408. Lacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 07-3961, 2008 WL 2178099, at *4 (6th Cir. May 22,
2008) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bobo v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 52 F.3d 1406 (6th
Cir. 1995)).
409. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
410. USCOC of Va. #3, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343 F.3d 262, 271 (4th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)).
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other inferences might have been more reasonable”411 (Department
of Labor Benefits Review Board); “not irrational [ ] and is in
accordance with the law”412 (Benefits Review Board); “whether a
reasonable mind might accept a particular evidentiary record as
adequate to support a conclusion”413 (Patent and Trademark Office);
and whether “a reasonable jury could have found” the facts the
agency found414 (NLRB). As noted earlier in Part I.C, even within
the immigration context, the language used to explain the substantial evidence standard has ranged considerably.415
Essentially, as one scholar has argued, substantial evidence has
become a reasonability standard in application.416 The standard
encompasses a range of deference that gives judges latitude to factor
in the capabilities and the credibility of the agency’s fact-finding
process. After concluding that technical findings by the PTO deserve
more deference than findings made by trial judges due to the PTO’s
superior expertise, Justice Breyer and the majority in Zurko
emphasized that ultimately, what appellate judges are trying to do
when they review findings by an agency is to assess “intangible
factors such as judicial confidence in the fairness of the fact-finding
process.”417 Indeed, even after Justice Breyer’s carefully calibrated
analysis of the difference between the clear error standard of review
and the substantial evidence standard of review, the Court admitted, “[C]ase-specific factors, such as a finding’s dependence upon
agency expertise or the presence of internal agency review ... will
often prove more influential in respect to outcome than will the
applicable standard of review.”418
This view of judicial review echoes what the Court stated almost
half a century ago in Universal Camera Corp., one of the earliest
cases to analyze the substantial evidence standard of review.419 The
case involved review of factual findings made by the National Labor

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Green, 656 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 2011).
Pietrunti v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 119 F.3d 1035, 1040 (2d Cir. 1997).
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162-63 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 367 (1998).
See supra Part I.C.
See Zaring, supra note 2, at 148.
Zurko, 527 U.S. at 163 (citation omitted).
Id.
340 U.S. 474, 489, 477 (1951).
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Relations Board.420 There, the Court admitted to the difficulty of
capturing in words what is entailed in the process of appellate
review.421 The Court did not assume that agencies possess expertise
merely by virtue of being an agency. Instead, the Court urged
deference for matters that are “within [the] special competence” of
the agency and matters over which the agency “carr[ies] the
authority of an expertness which courts do not possess.”422 Moreover, the Court required reviewing judges to canvass the “whole
record” to ascertain substantiality, and “not to abdicate[ ] the[ir]
conventional judicial function.”423
Judge Calabresi articulated a similar view in Mei Chai, in his
response to Judge Jacobs.424 He stated:
In the end, this disagreement over formal labels is not the real
issue. As our court [has] so presciently stated ... while the
various statements made in the course of upholding or rejecting
the adequacy of a particular finding are often helpful, they
cannot become rigid rules or law that dictate the outcome in
every case [] because we know of no way to apply precise calipers
to all such findings so that any particular finding would be
viewed by any three of the 23 judges of this Court as either
sustainable or not sustainable. In practice, panels will have to
do what judges always do in similar circumstances: apply their
best judgment, guided by the statutory standard governing
review and the holdings of our previous precedents, to the
administrative decision and the record assembled to support it.
And sound judgment of this sort cannot be channeled into rigid
formulae.425

420. Id.
421. See id. (“It cannot be too often repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate
reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character
and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its work.”).
422. Id. at 488, 490.
423. Id. at 477, 490.
424. 489 F.3d 517, 523-24 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007).
425. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

2013]

RETHINKING REVIEW STANDARDS

643

B. Akin to Hard Look Review
Such a standard is akin to “hard look” review. The hard look
doctrine has its origin in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,426
where Judge Leventhal articulated the “supervisory function”427 of
courts to police agencies and intervene “if the court becomes aware
... from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not
really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.”428 Though Judge
Leventhal used the words “hard look” to refer to the agency’s
responsibilities, the words have evolved to describe a rigorous
standard circuit judges apply to review agency decisions.429 In Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Mutual Insurance
Co., the Court established the doctrine and rooted its foundations in
section 706 of the APA, which requires that courts reverse agency
action if it is arbitrary and capricious.430 A court’s obligation to
review the entire record under the substantial evidence standard is
also a facet of the hard look requirement.
The hard look doctrine is not without its critics. Some have
questioned its legal basis431 and claimed that judges lack the
technical knowledge to make sound judgments about agency
decisions.432 Others say the doctrine leads to an ossification of
agency rule making because meeting a court’s demands is expensive, time consuming, and requires resources that the agency may
not have.433 These concerns are diminished in the immigration
426. 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
427. Id.
428. Id. (citation omitted).
429. Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
430. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”); Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness
Review, supra note 2, at 763.
431. See Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 2, at 762.
432. Breyer, supra note 2, at 388-90.
433. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out
About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 13-15 (2009) (discussing undue
ossification of rulemaking from analytical demands courts have made on agencies); Paul R.
Verkuil, The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
921, 928-29 (2007) (arguing that hard look review incentivizes agencies to hire consultants to
do their work, which does not achieve the purpose of hard look, which is to make agency
officials undergo their own intellectual exercise).
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context because, as discussed in Part II, the kinds of facts immigration judges find do not necessarily involve technical or scientific
expertise. Because striking down an agency decision under a hard
look review in the immigration context would essentially mean
requiring a more thorough fact-finding in individualized determinations, the concerns about freezing the status quo and discouraging
efficient agency decision making would be significantly less.
Moreover, courts appear to be applying hard look review to other
agencies, which provides precedent for the stricter review standard
articulated in immigration. Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have
argued that courts appear to be applying hard look review when
applying the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious
standards.434 In an empirical study of decisions rendered by the EPA
and NLRB from 1996 to 2006, they found that courts reversed
decisions at a 46 percent rate and attributed the high reversal rates
to the impermissible role that political ideology plays in hard look
review.435 That courts are reversing agencies that are, by most
accounts, more credible, capable, and highly resourced than the
immigration agency436 at a higher rate437 further supports adopting
a stricter approach in immigration.438
C. A Continuum of Deference
Since Mei Chai, Judge Calabresi and other judges on the panel
have decided and authored six opinions under the substantial
evidence standard.439 In every one, the panel granted the petition
434. Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 2, at 765.
435. Id. at 767.
436. See supra Part II.A.
437. In comparison, circuit courts reverse immigration agency decisions at rates
approximately between 5 percent (Fourth Circuit) and 25 percent (Seventh Circuit). See supra
notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
438. The high rate of reversal of the EPA and NLRB may also be explained by the kinds
of claims being challenged—those that are more prone to differences in political ideology—and
the quality of lawyers who challenge them—the kinds of large law firms bringing a challenge
to a decision by the EPA would be more likely to win on appeal than the kinds of lawyers who
appeal IJ and BIA appeals, see supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
439. See Jin Yi Liao v. Holder, 558 F.3d 152, 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2009); Aliyev v. Mukasey,
549 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2008); Diallo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 548 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir.
2008); Niang v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2007); Delgado v. Mukasey, 503 F.3d 702,
705 (2d Cir. 2007); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 2007).
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and remanded back to the agency.440 In none of them, however, has
the panel resurrected the “stricter” formulation of the substantial
evidence standard. But if standards of review are to mean
anything—and if Judge Calabresi and his colleagues are indeed
applying a stricter standard, as it appears from the outcome of the
six cases—then he should clearly state as much. Doing so would put
agencies on notice that their factual findings will receive careful
scrutiny and could achieve ex ante what a remand does ex post:
instructing the agency to develop the necessary facts and do a more
careful job in the first instance.441
Stricter review in immigration does not mean formulating a new
standard in immigration cases only or applying different standards
for different agencies. Rather, it means applying one standard but
understanding that the substantial evidence standard permits a
continuum of deference depending on the capabilities, expertise, and
reliability of the agency. Until Congress amends the INA to give
appellate courts more latitude to order more fact-finding,442 reviewing courts should embrace the latitude they already have under
the substantial evidence standard to remand decisions to ensure
440. See cases cited supra note 439.
441. Though there will be an initial added burden stemming from more remands, the
precise effect of more remands on the agency’s ability to manage its caseload is beyond the
scope of this article and a topic for future study.
442. Before the passage of the Immigration Reform and Illegal Immigration Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IRIIRA), Pub. L. 101-108, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), Congress explicitly gave, by
statute, appellate courts discretionary authority to remand to the agency for more factual
development. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (2006). For example, courts have taken judicial notice of nonrecord evidence and remanded under § 2347(c) for further consideration by the agency. See,
e.g., Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1002-04 (5th Cir. 1977) (taking judicial notice of Amnesty
International Report and remanding under § 2347(c)). The IRIIRA now generally precludes
this option. In only a limited number of circumstances may an appellate court remand to the
agency for additional fact-finding. One such circumstance is when the immigration judge does
not make an explicit credibility finding, yet the BIA mistakenly relies on a presumed adverse
determination to reach its conclusions. Wan Chien Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir.
2007) (“If, in the absence of a credibility finding by the IJ, a reviewing court determines that
such a finding is necessary for effective review of the case, it may remand to the agency for
further fact-finding.”). Another is when a reviewing appellate court determines that a
credibility finding is necessary to review the case and the immigration judge has not made
one. Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005); Hartooni v. INS, 21
F.3d 336, 343 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding for credibility determination). The ability to remand
for additional fact-finding appears to be limited to credibility determinations and compelling
circumstances in which not doing so would result in manifest injustice. Tian Ming Lin v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 473 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2007).
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that the quality of procedures employed at the agency was adequate
and that their decisions are considered and rest on accurate and
developed facts.443
CONCLUSION
Asylum adjudications are prone to significant mistakes. Though
the ideal solution would be to give the agency the resources
necessary to do its job well the first time, both political will and
capital are lacking. One consequence of this impasse is that some
noncitizens are removed on an inaccurate assessment of the facts.
With an agency either unable or unwilling to ensure an accurate
and fair fact-finding process, the first meaningful review of an
asylum applicant’s petition happens at the court of appeals. This
Article has articulated the bases for why reviewing courts need to
embrace the latitude they have to remand for an accurate assessment of the facts and a legal basis to do so under the substantial
evidence standard. Reviewing courts defer to reasonable decisions
by agencies. But without the necessary factual predicate for such
decisions—as is evident in many an immigration administrative
record—there is very little to which courts can defer.
The substantial evidence standard is appropriately less deferential in many asylum cases because not all justifications for agency
deference exist, nor are those that potentially exist very compelling.
If some agencies like the EOIR are no better situated than district
court judges to make findings of fact, then it is unclear why reviewing courts should accord them more deference than they do trial
judges. Indeed, the strong evidence of under-resourcing at the
agency level—which has manifested itself in egregious errors made
by immigration judges and the lack of meaningful review at the BIA
level—suggests that the agency is, in fact, in a worse position to
make accurate findings of fact as compared to a district judge. The
touchstone of any review standard, let alone the substantial
443. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
(remanding agency decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard for development of
the record that would give the reviewing court the “factors that were considered” by the
agency, the agency’s “construction of the evidence,” and “some explanation in order to
determine if the [agency] acted within the scope of [its] authority and if the [agency]’s action
was justifiable under the applicable standard”).
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evidence standard, is whether there can be “judicial confidence in
the fairness of the fact-finding process.”444 Sadly, in our current
system of asylum adjudication, such confidence may be misplaced.
Without that confidence, reviewing judges should be able to reject
findings when adequacy or accuracy is in doubt.
For decades, consensus in the immigration debate has been
elusive. But if there is one area where all sides of the debate can
find common ground, it is that removal decisions should be based on
accurate factual information. That can only happen with an agency
willing and able to employ a more accurate and adequate factfinding process and a reviewing court willing to police it.

444. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999).

